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Abstract
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) is the nonprofit governing body of
college athletics. They oversee three distinct divisions of competition containing over 430,000
student athletes and over 1,000 member institutions. 1 Their primary task is to ensure all studentathletes and the universities they attend adhere to the extensive rules and regulations outlined in
the Associations manual, namely, to abide by principles of amateurism, defined by the
Association as agents that do not receive any payment above travel expenses or a grant-in-aid
scholarship for competing in sports endeavors.
The problem is the NCAA is currently financially and academically exploiting college
athletes. The Association possesses an inordinate amount of control over young men and women,
and they exercise this power to exploit their unrecognized labor force and generate billions of
dollars in revenues, while restricting the amount of compensation the athletes receive to a
number well below what the free market will bear. College athletes are not receiving any of the
money they produce, and most will not benefit in any real way from the educational product they
are provided. The system must be reformed.
The first step will be to eliminate financially defined amateurism along with the NCAA’s
expansive rulebook. Second, student athletes should be allowed to set their own course load.
This includes not taking any classes if they choose, thus ending the charade that athletes are
recruited to campus as students first, even when it is clear many have no interest in academics.

1

“About the NCAA,” National Collegiate Athletic Association, 2013, http://www.ncaa.org/.
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Third, courses should be tailored to pique the interest of athletes, namely offering majors in
sports. Finally, university athletic departments need to be scaled down to truly comply with Title
IX requirements and stop wasting exorbitant sums of money. The hypocrisy and deception must
end.

Introduction
Johnny Manziel, better known as Johnny Football, is the electric 2012 Heisman Trophy
winning quarterback for Texas A&M University. Manziel was also presented the Davey O'Brien
National Quarterback Award, the Manning Award, and was named the Sporting News College
Football Player of the Year, along with many other accolades for his performance during the
2012 football season. In his first season of competition, Manziel passed for 3,419 yards, rushed
for 1,181 yards, and accounted for 43 touchdowns. 2 These numbers and honors are stellar
considering Manziel was a red-shirt freshman during the 2012-2013 college football season. 3
Becoming the first freshman to win the coveted Heisman Trophy is certainly something to revel
in, and Manziel has spent the offseason doing just that.
Since he claimed his Heisman Trophy, Manziel has been spotted drinking in public,
gambling, clubbing, driving his teammates around in his Mercedes Benz, and sitting courtside at
a Dallas Mavericks game. Manziel has not violated any National Collegiate Athletic Association
(hereafter NCAA or the Association) rules by engaging in the aforementioned activities, but a
college freshman driving a Mercedes Benz and sitting courtside at an NBA game is certainly
going to pique the interest of both the media and NCAA enforcement officials. His lifestyle is
tailor made for the spotlight, and his actions will surely be scrutinized for the foreseeable future.
2

Justin Onslow, “Johnny Manziel: Next Step for First Freshman Heisman Winner to Solidify Legacy,”
Bleacher Report, January 4, 2013, http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1468868-johnny-manziel-next-step-for-firstfreshman-heisman-winner-to-solidify-legacy.
3
A “red-shirt” player is one that has sat out a year of competition for some reason (playing time concerns,
injury, etc.). This player continues to attend classes and practices, but is ineligible for competition during the redshirted season. A player that has been red-shirted gains a “fifth year” of eligibility, although they may only compete
in games for four seasons.
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Manziel’s fame has had some unfortunate consequences for his academic life however.
He is taking his spring courses online due to the frenzy his mere presence creates on campus. He
attempted to take regular courses, but the first day he showed up, he claims the situation “kind of
turned into more of a big deal than I thought.” 4 One could imagine he was not simply ignored by
his fellow classmates. He will return to the traditional classroom in the fall, hopefully to a more
subdued atmosphere. Manziel is having an impact both on and off the field, and he is proving to
be a headache for the NCAA.
In a recent study commissioned by Texas A&M, analysts claim that Manziel generated
$37 million in media exposure during the past season. 5 During his freshman campaign, the
moniker Johnny Football became associated with the young man, who was clever enough to
trademark his new nickname. 6 Under NCAA regulations, Manziel is not entitled to one cent of
that $37 million dollars, but he may have a big payday coming his way soon. Manziel and his
legal team have recently filed a lawsuit that could net him damages for the unauthorized use of
his image, specifically the Johnny Football nickname. The NCAA has ruled any damages
Manziel wins in court are his to keep, and claim they have closed the loophole in their rule book
in case any future players see this as their window to be paid for their work as college athletes. 7
The loophole in question refers to the ability of any player to hire an attorney, have their

4

Jeremy Fowler, “Johnny Manziel won't be Johnny Online for Long,” CBS Sports, March 1, 2013,
http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/blog/jeremy-fowler/21791629/johnny-manziel-wont-be-johnny-onlinefor-long.
5
Matt Murschel, “Study: Johnny Manziel Generated $37 Million in Exposure for Texas A&M,” the
Orlando Sentinel, January 18, 2013, http://www.orlandosentinel.com/sports/blogs/college-gridiron-365/os-fbcstudy-johnny-manziel-generated-37-million-in-exposure-for-texas-am-20130118,0,5117146.post.
6
Cody Coil, “Johnny Football: A Nickname Coined in Aggieland, a Legend Crafted in the Hill Country,”
September 23, 2012, http://www.kbtx.com/home/headlines/Johnny-Football-Nickname-started-in-Aggieland-buthis-legend-began-in-the-Hill-Country-170922091.html. The exact day and time the nickname was conferred is
unknown, but the Aggies are insistent it is wholly a College Station creation.
7
Andy Staples, “NCAA Rules Clarification Closes Johnny Football Loophole,” Sports Illustrated, February
26, 2013, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/college-football/news/20130226/johnny-manziel-ncaa-loophole.
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image trademarked and have a supporter of the athletic department, commonly known as a
booster, reproduce this trademarked image in some way. The player can then sue the booster,
settle out of court for whatever amount the booster wanted to give the athlete, and college
athletes can be paid without violating NCAA regulations. 8 The NCAA claims however that any
type of orchestrated payment between an athlete and a booster would fall under the purview of
its enforcement staff and would in fact be a violation. 9 However, the NCAA is in more trouble
here than they think.
If all current elite athletes were to trademark their images, what would stop a booster,
operating on his own, from intentionally violating the trademark and offering whatever cash he
wished to give to the player in an out of court settlement? Elite athletes can use this as a way to
be paid during their college years without violating NCAA regulations, all they need is to
register a trademark and wait for it to be violated. 10 The case of Johnny Manziel is indeed
remarkable, and given the NCAA’s position on his recent lawsuit, he may have broken down the
longest running scam in sports history; the denial of payment to elite college athletes.
Johnny Manziel presents an interesting look into the life of a star college athlete. The
power the NCAA holds over those who participate in college athletics is enormous, evidenced by
every public action taken by an athlete such as Johnny Manziel being magnified and examined
for possible rule violations. As he sat courtside for the Dallas Mavericks game, the commentators
questioned how a college freshman could acquire such desirable seats, insinuating he did not
purchase the tickets for himself. The NCAA uses an expansive 439 page rule book to legislate
8

Clay Travis, "Johnny Manziel Opens Massive Loophole In Paying Players Rule," Out Kick The
Coverage, February 25, 2013, http://outkickthecoverage.com/johnny-manziel-opens-massive-loophole-in-payingplayers-rule.php.
9
Staples, “NCAA Rules Clarification Closes Johnny Football Loophole,”
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/college-football/news/20130226/johnny-manziel-ncaa-loophole.
10
Travis, "Johnny Manziel Opens Massive Loophole,” http://outkickthecoverage.com/johnny-manzielopens-massive-loophole-in-paying-players-rule.php.
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the minutest details of the relationship between the athlete and the member institution they
attended, as well as dealings with outside third parties and is revised and issued annually.
Athletes, especially elite athletes, simply cannot function as regular students, despite NCAA
claims to the contrary.
In the following pages, I plan to offer an ethical audit of the NCAA by thoroughly
examining the unique relationship between the student athlete, the NCAA and the institutions for
which the athletes compete. By examining the NCAA bylaws regarding academic standards and
eligibility requirements, I will highlight the ethical shortcomings and hypocrisy of the NCAA
and its member institutions in regards to their treatment of prospective, past and current
collegiate student athletes. This analysis will show the compensation currently provided to
student athletes, a prospective four year degree, is not at all reasonable or fair given the current
climate of collegiate sports.
The most pressing problem with the current system of college athletics is the exploitation
of student athletes by the NCAA and its member institutions. The current design of the system
makes the exploitation of athletes in revenue producing sports impossible to avoid. Due to the
immense popularity of these sports, providing access to them has become a lucrative business. In
business, the goal is to maximize profits while limiting costs. The system needs the labor of these
athletes to generate revenues, and because college sports are a business enterprise, the lower the
compensation provided to the athletes, the greater the revenues university’s and the NCAA
enjoy. The actions and policies undertaken and implemented by the Association and its member
institutions are designed to maximize gains while limiting costs. This thesis will show how the
current arrangement has the unfortunate consequence of exploiting the talents of young athletes
for financial gain.

5
This project begins with an introduction to the Association and a brief discussion of the
origins of the NCAA. Following this, a case is made in chapter three that shows how the NCAA
currently functions as a cartel designed to keep labor costs associated with athletes minimal,
while maximizing gains for themselves and their member schools. A cartel here is understood as
a group of independent producers who join together to control the production, price and sale of a
commodity to establish a monopoly. 11 This collusive agreement amongst schools can be offered
as a potential explanation for the level of exploitation that currently exists in college sports.
Chapter four discusses how the association began to grow quickly after its creation,
spreading its influence and power as college sports, particularly football, became more popular
amongst the general public. The blue print for how programs jump into big time college sports is
also revealed.
Chapter five provides a continued discussion of the Associations growth from 1948
through 1980, while also showing how the NCAA cartel fully matures by developing an
effective enforcement mechanism for its rules, binding member institutions to the Associations
rules and providing them unchecked power in enforcement matters. This chapter also presents
the introduction of exploitive policies instituted by the NCAA including the full athletic
scholarship, the national letter-of-intent which is the contract athlete’s sign when they commit to
play for an institution, and rules concerning academic eligibility.
Chapter six concludes the historical look at the Association, showing how the Supreme
Court broke the NCAA’s television cartel, sparking frequent conference realignments which had
the effect of altering the landscape of intercollegiate sports.
Chapter seven uses the information provided in previous chapters to illustrate how
11

Andrew S. Zimbalist, Unpaid Professionals: Commercialism and Conflict in Big-Time College Sports
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 149.
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college athletes in revenue producing sports are being both financially and academically
exploited.12 A presentation of graduation rates and the quality of the education received by the
few that graduate highlights the fact that far too many athletes do not get any meaningful benefit
from their time as student athletes. To show the level of financial exploitation, Karl Marx’s
theory of exploitation is used to further elucidate that athletic scholarships are actually one-sided
deals designed to benefit colleges and universities at the expense of athletes. Also, a discussion
of a Rawlsian conception of fairness is introduced. The current system is examined through
Rawls’s original position, coupled with the veil of ignorance, to prove the current system could
not be agreed to as fair by rational actors when they do not know their place in the arrangement.
From this discussion, a case is made that even though some athletes may benefit from the current
arrangement, they are still being exploited.
Chapter eight outlines how college sports currently function as a business enterprise
designed to turn a profit which explains how the system fosters exploitive practices. This chapter
also explains how the conflicting roles of college student and college athlete more often than not
set student athletes in revenue producing sports up for failure.
Chapter nine argues that the NCAA and its member institutions, through the creation and
enforcement of rules limits the autonomy of athletes in the revenue producing sports beyond
levels experienced by any other college athlete or student. These rules appear to be arbitrary,
lacking any type of transparency, and are not explained in an in-depth way to coaches or players,
contributing to the exploitation of athletes.
Chapter ten discusses another example of the exploitation of college athletes, the
NCAA’s version of amateurism, which hurts the welfare of these athletes by arbitrarily denying
12

Revenue producing college sports are men’s Division I football and basketball. Men’s Division I baseball
and ice hockey also generate revenue surpluses in certain regions of the country, but not to the same extent.
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them fair compensation. Amateurism, according to the NCAA is defined only in monetary terms
and serves as a shield for the Association and its member institutions, protecting them from
being required to provide appropriate financial recompense to college athletes.
Chapter eleven continues the discussion of the severe restrictions on athlete autonomy
and the total control the NCAA and its member institutions can exert over all aspects of athletes
lives. This chapter is dedicated to the NCAA transfer rules that apply only to revenue producing
sports.
Chapter twelve provides a discussion of an impending legal battle between the
Association and former as well as current student athletes. The players are asking for a fair
compensation package, including a share of television revenues and merchandise sales that
depict the images of athletes; compensation they are currently denied under the existing
arrangement of intercollegiate sports.
Chapter thirteen lays out the current financial landscape of college sports, showing that it
is in fact a six and a half billion dollar industry that provides excellent financial remuneration for
all actors except the athletes who make generating this revenue possible.
Chapter fourteen offers an ethical audit of the Associations practices through a
deontological ethical framework, focusing on the moral theory of Immanuel Kant and the
principles of fairness, autonomy, and voluntary informed consent. Concerning voluntary
informed consent, recruiters often use bait-and-switch tactics to entice potential recruits. This is a
form of deception that sells the potential recruit on a certain appealing image of life as a student
athlete, when the reality is in fact much less desirable. This chapter also explains that for athletes
who wish to reach the professional ranks in football or basketball, there are no true viable
alternatives outside of participation in intercollegiate sports.

8
Chapter fifteen offers steps for reform to remove the exploitation from the intercollegiate
sports system. Steps for reform include replacing the NCAA’s extensive rule book in favor of a
small set of general principles, eliminating the NCAA’s financially defined vision of amateurism
and its inconsistent transfer rules, scaling down athletic departments to make them truly
compliant with Title IX legislation, allowing athletes to set their own academic schedules and
course loads, and providing the opportunity for athletes to major in sports. This would allow
athletes to truly engage in college level work and offer them a beneficial educational experience
they can use after they leave their respective institutions.

9

Chapter 1: The National Collegiate Athletic Association
The NCAA serves as the governing body for intercollegiate athletics. Since 1999, they
have been headquartered in Indianapolis, Indiana and are a nonprofit organization that oversees
three distinct divisions of collegiate athletic competition for over 1,000 member schools that
includes roughly 430,000 student-athletes. 13 The three divisions under the control of the NCAA
are cleverly named Divisions I, II, and III. Division I is the largest, and currently is home to onehundred and twenty-four college football programs, and three-hundred and forty-seven college
basketball programs. 14 These numbers change almost every year, as new teams are constantly
attempting to make the jump to the big-time.
The reason there are almost one-third fewer football teams is the cost associated with
running an FBS college football program is much higher than running a Division I basketball
program. Teams carry fewer scholarship players, they need fewer coaches to direct these players,
and they have fewer costs associated with travel and training. 15 There is a much higher
likelihood of financial success in college basketball for a smaller university than would be for
football. Also, when the end of season basketball tournaments begin, theoretically a team that
has lost every game during the regular season can win its conference tournament and receive an
automatic bid to the NCAA National Championship tournament. If your team gets hot at the
13

“About the NCAA,” National Collegiate Athletic Association, http://www.ncaa.org/. Prior to 1999, the
association was headquartered in Kansas City, Missouri.
14
Division I football teams (previously Division-IA) are now referred to as the Football Bowl Subdivision
(hereafter FBS), while the lower Division II and III university football programs (previously Division-IAA) are
referred to as Football Championship Subdivision (hereafter FCS).
15
Roger G. Noll, "The Economics of Intercollegiate Sports," in Rethinking College Athletics, edited by
Judith Andre and David N. James, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991), 204.
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right time, all you must do is survive and advance, knowing the deeper into the tournament you
get, the deeper your pockets will be. 16
The structure of the NCAA is broken down into six sections under the supervision of
current President Mark Emmert. There are the administrative services, the championship and
alliances office, the communications department, the NCAA eligibility center, the enforcement
staff, and the membership and student-athlete affairs office; all overseen by the office of the
president, which also contains legal affairs, government relations and human resources. 17
The employees of the NCAA are also governed by an extensive rule-book known as the
NCAA Office Policies and Procedures. 18 The booklet was a creation of former Association
President Walter Byers, and in the 1980’s contained over one-hundred pages with detailed
explanations for how each man and woman should dress, a protocol for the correct hanging and
opening of window drapes, and it was required that the booklet be turned in upon an employee’s
resignation or termination. 19
The NCAA is a relatively small organization that holds a great deal of power in
intercollegiate athletics. The effects of the Association’s actions are felt by millions of
individuals, and they have the ability to drastically alter the life experience of both student
athletes and athletic coaches. Their enforcement powers are absolute, and the following pages
strive to show how this immense power is causing undue to harm to college athletes.

16

The term “survive and advance” has become the most over used cliché associated with NCAA
tournaments. Its obviousness is rather insufferable. Also, there are financial enticements associated with how deep a
team advances in the championship tournament.
17
“National Office,” National Collegiate Athletic Association, http://www.ncaa.org/.
18
Don Yeager, Undue Process: The NCAA's Injustice for All (Champaign: Sagamore Publishing, 1991),
17-18.
19
Ibid.
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Chapter 2: Origins of the Association
An understanding of the origins and history of the Association is necessary to understand
the current climate of college sports. The NCAA has origins in tragedy. Founded in 1906, the
organization was brought about in part to restore amateurism rules that had been abandoned, but
their main undertaking was to curb the overwhelmingly violent nature of college football. 20
College football in America dates back to the 1869; the first game was played between Rutgers
University and Princeton University. 21 Rutgers emerged victorious in that contest, and the game
resembled more of a rugby match than the football we know today. 22 The game was really quite
brutal. Shortly after the turn of the century, the game had reached a tipping point. Lacking
effective rules accepted by all competitors, violence and death were common place in early
college football. 23
The 1905 college football season was especially vicious, with nineteen player deaths and
one-hundred and thirty-seven more being seriously injured. 24 Columbia University, among
others, had decided to disband their football team until a standardized, agreed upon set of rules
was established to limit the brutality. 25 The New York Times Tribune, reporting on the 1905

20

Allen L. Sack and Ellen J. Staurowsky, College Athletes for Hire: The Evolution and Legacy of the
NCAA's Amateur Myth (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 1998), 32-33.
21
“Rutgers- The Birthplace of Intercollegiate Football,” Rutgers University, accessed January 28, 2013,
http://www.scarletknights.com/football/history/first-game.asp.
22
Ibid.
23
Arthur A. Fleisher III, Brian L. Goff, and Robert D. Tollison, The National Collegiate Athletic
Association (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1992), 18.
24
“The San Francisco Call,” Chronicling America, November 27, 1905,
http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn85066387/1905-11-27/ed-1/seq-1/.
25
“New-York Tribune,” Chronicling America, November 29, 1905,
http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn83030214/1905-11-29/ed-1/seq-1/.
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season reported “this year’s record of deaths is nearly double that of the yearly average for the
last five years, the total for that period being forty-five.” 26 Among those who perished during the
1905 season, eleven were high school students, ten of which were seventeen or younger, along
with, as described by the Tribune, “three hardened, seasoned, presumably physically fit college
men.” 27 The other causalities were described simply as amateurs.
The accounts of these early games are shocking. Congressman Charles B. Landis, after
watching his first intercollegiate football game, remarked, “I desire to register my opinion,
however, that dog fighting, cock fighting, and bull fighting are Sabbath school games in
comparison with modern football.” 28 Congressman Landis was not the only politician who had
taken notice of the growing number of causalities associated with the sport. Amidst public cries
to abolish the game in 1905, President Theodore Roosevelt called for the game of football to be
reformed. 29
On March 31, 1906, the Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the United States
(hereafter IAAUS) was formed as a solution to the ills of college football. 30 In 1910, this group
would change its name to the National Collegiate Athletic Association, better known as the
NCAA.
This chapter provides the rationale for the creation of the NCAA. The violence associated
with early college football in this country was horrific. The NCAA was created out of necessity
26

“New-York Tribune,” Chronicling America, http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn83030214/190511-29/ed-1/seq-1/.
27
“The San Francisco Call,” Chronicling America,
http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn85066387/1905-11-27/ed-1/seq-1/. Of those who perished, four died of
internal injuries, six from concussions, three from spinal cord injuries, and two from blood poisoning. The deceased
athletes are referred to as “gridiron warriors.”
28
“The Salt Lake Herald,” Chronicling America, October 15, 1905,
http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn85058130/1905-10-15/ed-1/seq-4/.
29
Sack and Staurowsky, College Athletes for Hire, 32. Roosevelt was a fan of the game, and his son was
playing football as a college freshman in 1905 (consult note 25 for more information).
30
“History,” National Collegiate Athletic Association, http://www.ncaa.org/.
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to save a game that was on the brink of collapse, a game that has risen in popularity with each
passing year since 1869. The creation of the Association was indeed a public good. The NCAA
was able to unify playing rules for college football teams and helped to preserve an American
pastime while also protecting those who competed so passionately.

14

Chapter 3: The Formation of the Cartel
The NCAA, from its beginnings in 1906 has evolved into a cartel. Andrew Zimbalist
writes, “most economists look at the NCAA’s rules and see a cartel, endeavoring to maintain a
player reserve system and contain its costs.” 31 A cartel here can be understood as independent
producers, or colleges and universities, who formerly operated without any oversight coming
together to create a monopoly, or to possess all control over the market supply of a good, namely
college sports. 32 In their work, “The National Collegiate Athletic Association,” Arthur Fleisher,
Brian Goff, and Robert Tollison present a five step prima facie argument showing the NCAA as
a cartel. Looking only at the behavior of the NCAA, a compelling case can be made.
First, schools openly collude with one another to achieve ends beyond their stated goal of
standardizing rules of the game. 33 An example of this can be seen in conference affiliations.
Conferences will usually organize the television rights deals for all member institutions. 34 This
shows clear collusion amongst competing producers to maximize profits for all. By joining
together, the media rights deal they can secure as a group will produce greater amounts of
revenue for all members than any they would be able to achieve by negotiating television rights
deals independently.

31

Zimbalist, Unpaid Professionals, 18.
Ibid., 149.
33
Fleisher III, Goff, and Tollison, The National Collegiate Athletic Association, 7-8.
34
Glenn M. Wong, Essentials of Sports Law, 4th ed., (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2010), 728. e-book.
32
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Second, athlete compensation has remained relatively the same (full grant-in-aid
scholarships) while coach salaries, revenues, and monies spent on athletic expenditures has
exploded. 35 In support of this claim, there is clear evidence that the producers of college athletics
have colluded to keep athlete compensation costs well below the value of what these athletes
generate for their institutions. 36 Third, the NCAA does not restrict school brand names or other
capital assets such as stadiums, training facilities, food offered on campus to athletes, living
quarters or dormitories, and uniforms. 37 These are a few of the ways colleges can offer a little
more to athletes over and above what is allowed by a full grant-in-aid scholarship. 38
These unregulated tools are in fact what separate universities from one another. Uniform
combinations have recently become the most innovative way to attract young recruits to schools.
The University of Oregon, as of April 2012, had five-hundred and twelve different uniform
combinations, and a state of the art locker room that resembles a futuristic mansion. 39 Nike
founder Phil Knight, a University of Oregon alumni, makes sure to keep his old school outfitted
with the best money can buy. Recruits are aware of the perks Nike supplies, and because of this
they have become increasingly more interested in the football program. Historically, the
university has struggled to bring in elite athletes, but over the last decade Oregon is perennially a
nationally top five ranked football program. Something like uniforms may seem trivial, but it
brings attention to a program, which can result in landing top-ranked recruits.
35

Fleisher III, Goff, and Tollison, The National Collegiate Athletic Association, 8.
Ibid.
37
Fleisher III, Goff, and Tollison, The National Collegiate Athletic Association, 8-9.
38
Extravagant dorms and facilities are ways to lure players in; they are not forms of payment, however.
These things are financed with athletic department surpluses and booster donations. The NCAA does have rules
regarding how numbers, logos, and patches can fit onto uniforms, but have no rules regulating the actual content or
color of the uniform. See Bylaw 12.5.4 in the National Collegiate Athletic Association 2011-2012 NCAA Division I
Manual, http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D112.pdf.
39
Ben Maller, “Oregon Ducks’ Amazing Locker Room,” The Post Game, April 13, 2012,
http://www.thepostgame.com/blog/dish/201204/oregon-ducks-give-nike-ceo-sunglass-tribute. A video tour is
available at the website, it is quite impressive.
36
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Stadium renovations have been another must have for big-time college sports teams since
the mid-1990’s, with a favorite addition being luxury boxes. 40 Stadium renovations will increase
both revenues and attendance. Currently, six college universities have stadiums that seat over
one-hundred thousand spectators, and five more can seat over ninety-thousand. Professional
stadiums pale in comparison to their college counterparts. Fleischer, Goff, and Tollison contend,
“if a quest for education, amateurism, and standardized rules were at the heart of NCAA
behavior, these inputs would be regulated along with labor inputs.” 41 The authors are pointing
the fact that unregulated recruiting tools like uniforms and stadiums are designed to draw
exposure, or an audience. Colossal stadiums and flashy new uniforms are intended to bring in
revenue. Collegiate sports are in the business of making money, and these are methods to
increase the amount of money schools can bring in.
Fourth, athletes are worth substantially more to the university than what they receive to
compete. In Division I football and basketball specifically, the value of the athletes, or their
marginal revenue products (MRP’s), far exceed the value of the education they are provided. 42
Stated more clearly, universities are disproportionately benefitting from the labor of college
athletes. George Sage writes, “Collegiate athletes generate 10 to 20 times as much income as
their scholarship is worth to a school; a few generate as much as 100 times what they receive.” 43
According to Roger Noll, a starting player on a winning team, in a good conference is paid
roughly three to ten percent of their actual economic value to the university. 44 Noll’s numbers
are from 1991, and given that athlete compensation has stayed relatively the same, while
40
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revenues continue to increase, universities are bringing in increasingly more money annually
than they spend on their athletes, greatly increasing these ratios.
Fifth, the fact that universities are willing to offer illicit payments to athletes in excess of
what a full grant-in-aid scholarship allows indicates cartel rewards, or excess money left after
production costs, attempting to find their way to a relevant expense, or input. 45 Illicit payments
have a long history in college football. A recent example involves Mississippi State University
offering $80,000 among other enticements to Cam Newton’s father in exchange for his
commitment to the university. This is a large sum of money to the average person, however, it is
a meager sum for Cam Newton’s athletic ability; just ask the Carolina Panthers. Newton’s rookie
deal is for four years and is worth twenty-two million dollars. 46 Eighty-thousand dollars for one
year could have been the steal of the century.
Fleischer, Goff, and Tollison argue that the NCAA’s behavior in setting prices for college
sports, controlling outputs, not controlling relevant inputs (like stadiums, living quarters and
uniforms) and visible undercompensating of athletes below their market value, when taken as a
whole, indicate cartel behavior. 47 So, on face value, the NCAA is a cartel, but why is this
significant? The cartel in this instance is designed to benefit the member institutions of the
NCAA, and it is currently doing so by exploiting the talents of Division I football and basketball
players. 48 The way in which cartel members are benefitting is causing their unacknowledged
workers to suffer. This case will be made explicit beginning in chapter seven. This arrangement
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did not happen overnight; it took years for the NCAA to mature into the mighty powerhouse that
exists today.
As previously discussed, the violent nature of early college football brought the NCAA
into being. It was the lack of uniform playing rules of early college football that in part led to
violence in the game, an externality problem. 49 School’s recognized the problem, but faced a
prisoner’s dilemma; it would be in all parties best interests to cooperate, however, without some
type of agreement among all universities, accompanied with a punishment mechanism, any
school that decided to play by a standard set of rules would be at a disadvantage while others
schools continued to cheat. 50
Universities did not originally cooperate with one another to form a cartel. Initially,
cooperation amongst firms was to solve their common externality problem. 51 According to the
Association’s website, in its infancy, the NCAA was primarily concerned with discussing
problems facing college sports and developing unified rules for the games played on college
campuses. 52 However, after resolving the issue of excessive violence of college football, the
NCAA sought to expand its umbrella of influence. By 1920, eight more sports fell under the
jurisdiction of the association. 53 During this time, college sports began to see an increase in their
popularity, and commercial interests soon emerged.
The aim of this chapter is to present a case for viewing the NCAA as a cartel. One may
reject the usage of the term cartel and still accept the thesis of this work; the NCAA currently
exploits college athletes in revenue producing sports. Viewing the NCAA as a cartel can offer a
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window into why the Association behaves as it does. Proving this point definitively would go
beyond the bounds of this project, requiring more space than what is available here. The reader
can draw their own conclusions about the NCAA as a cartel based on the arguments provided in
the following pages.
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Chapter 4: Commercialization and Professionalization
In 1912, college football experienced its first radio broadcast. 54 The first commercial
broadcast came in 1920, followed by the first network covered game courtesy of NBC. 55 The
Association began with fewer than one-hundred members; by 1945 membership was up to twohundred and ten universities. 56 In 1939, television entered the game, airing college baseball in
the summer and football in the fall. 57 With the invention of new media outlets providing easier
access to games, popularity in college sports, especially football, grew exponentially.
Commercialization had struck the NCAA, who at the time controlled all broadcasting
rights to college sports. Since cartel profits depend on the supply and demand of markets, as the
demand rises, the profits increase, and other producers inevitably want to join the club. 58 As the
popularity of college sports began to grow, universities that were not governed by the NCAA
saw themselves missing out on profits from broadcasting rights they could get if they were
members of the Association. Thus, there was a large increase in schools that wanted to join the
NCAA.
While this was going on, the NCAA also was attempting to regulate the activities of its
current member institutions. Athletic grant-in-aids were not permitted during this era of the
NCAA; no institution was allowed to provide any type of payment to an athlete in exchange for
their athletic ability. The athlete had to qualify for financial assistance, a need-based model. The
54
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NCAA had rules on prohibiting subsidization of athletes and rules concerning eligibility,
yet they lacked any real enforcement mechanism; a necessary condition for cartel success. 59
With no enforcement procedures in place, NCAA rules were simply window dressing. A 1929
Carnegie Foundation study found some type of athlete subsidization occurring at eighty-one of
one-hundred twelve schools studied, a clear violation of NCAA rules. 60 The writing was on the
wall; without an enforcement mechanism, schools would violate the Associations rules whenever
it benefitted them.
As the popularity of college football reached new heights, paying athletes financial costs,
a clear violation of NCAA rules, was on the rise as well. The college football arms race had
begun. Schools in the Southeastern, Southern, and Southwest conferences were subsidizing
athlete’s costs, while schools in the Big Ten and Ivey League were complaining about the unfair
advantage in recruiting their rivals had, decrying athletic scholarships as violations to the
NCAA’s principles on amateurism. 61
By 1945, wholly opposing athletic scholarships, the Ivey League institutions had seen
enough of big-time college sports. 62 They decided to deemphasize sports, and adhere to the
principles of amateurism they felt properly applied to college sports. 63 One year later, the
University of Chicago also gave up on big-time athletics, deciding sport had a minimal place in
higher education. They left the Big Ten June 30, 1946. 64 The conference had a different take on
Chicago’s exit, claiming the university had lost the ability to field competitive sports teams. 65
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These two moves were indeed surprising.
Chicago and the Ivey League schools were the birthplace of big-time college sports.
Chicago was one of the first universities to capitalize on the popularity of intercollegiate sport,
hiring highly paid coach Amos Stagg around the turn of the century and instructing him to
develop a winning football team that would crush its opposition in a manner that would excite
the general public to spend money by attending games. 66 Chicago offered large monetary
enticements, including tuition and room and board to prospective athletes, and their success on
the field saw enrolment at the university jump from 1,815 to 5,550 between 1896 and 1909. 67
Many would call the move to a pure need-based model of athletics noble or truly embracing the
principle of amateurism, but it is entirely possible they simply could not compete with the new
powerhouses of the game they invented.
In 1949, Michigan State University would take Chicago’s place in the Big Ten, setting
the present-day model for how to jump to the big-time. Michigan State has grown into a highly
successful athletic powerhouse and has seen a large increase in its enrollment since joining the
Big Ten, while the University of Chicago has kept its renowned reputation for being one of the
finest institutions of higher learning in the country. 68 Michigan State is one of only a handful of
schools that is annually in the top 25 rankings in both football and basketball, and their jump to
the big-time in 1949 provided a road map for schools like Florida State University (a former all
girls college), UNLV, and the University of Houston. 69
This chapter outlines two main points about college sports in the early years after the
creation of the NCAA. First, the invention and availability of new media outlets contributed to
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both the growth of intercollegiate sports as well as the growth of the Association’s membership.
Second, the prohibition on athletic based financial aid created a dichotomy between the NCAA’s
members which led to a power shift in the collegiate football landscape. Teams from the Ivey
League schools that had ruled the collegiate football landscape early now found themselves
either unwilling or unable to compete with newcomers who were seeking the new financial
heights offered by college football. This trend of jumping to the big-time, or Division I athletic
competition has been followed by hundreds of universities and continues to this day.
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Chapter 5: Expansion, Growth, and the Maturation of the Cartel
With the college athletic landscape reshaping rapidly, the NCAA cartel was evolving as
well, fully maturing from 1948 to 1952. 70 College sports were under no real control during this
time frame. The NCAA was the governing body in charge, but there were no teeth to back up its
rules. To remedy this, the Sanity Code was introduced in 1946 with rules covering financial aid,
eligibility, and contained a punishment mechanism for rules violations. 71 The code was adopted
in 1948, allowing for aid to be given for athletic ability so long as the player in question qualified
for financial need, and was not offered financial aid by a coach or recruiter. 72
The code did not last long however, it died just two-years later. The only punishment
option was to expel the violating institution from the NCAA. 73 In 1950, as the Association was
prepared to suspend seven institutions for noncompliance when news broke that the Southwest,
Southern, and Southeastern conferences would break from the NCAA if the seven schools were
in fact dismissed. 74 The appropriate number of votes was not achieved, no institution left or was
forced out of the Association, and the code faded away. 75
The NCAA did not give up however, and finally established an enforcement mechanism
that lasted in 1952. The Membership Committee was established, which later became known as
the Subcommittee on Infractions, and was equipped with new penalties that fell short of outright
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expulsion from the Association. 76
The first penalty handed down by the NCAA involved a point shaving incident at the
University of Kentucky in 1955. 77 Several men’s basketball players were involved, and the
university was hit with a one-year ban from competition. 78 This was a landmark case for the
Association, because it was the first time they were able to show their member institutions they
could actually enforce the rules they expected all universities to abide by. 79 The NCAA as a
cartel had officially come into existence. The penalty levied in this case is now the most severe
penalty the NCAA possesses, aptly known as the Death Penalty. 80
By the 1950’s, the NCAA had become nationally relevant and it proved that it was able
to enforce its lengthy rulebook in the name of amateurism. In 1952, the Association saw its
commercial interests realized in a big way as well, when then president of the NCAA Walter
Byers sold the television rights to broadcast college football in a package that featured one game
per week for twelve weeks to NBC for $1.144 million. 81 Roughly thirty-years later, Byers would
sign his last television agreement, allowing multiple networks broadcasting rights for the sum of
$281.196 million.82 College football is indeed big business.
The 1950’s were a busy decade for the Association. The enforcement staff was showing
off its muscle, the television dollars were rolling in, and they were able to coin a new term that
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deceives the American public to this day; the student-athlete. Ernest Nemeth was a football
player at the University of Denver who sued the university for workers compensation benefits to
cover his football injuries. 83 The Colorado Supreme Court, to the shock of the NCAA, ruled
Nemeth was an employee of the university, making them responsible for covering his football
injuries via worker’s compensation. 84 Walter Byers, then president of the NCAA, admits his
feelings about the idea of college athletes being considered employees, “I was shocked that
outsiders could believe that young men on grants-in-aid playing college sports should be
classified as workers.” 85
The NCAA took quick action to ensure this would not become a wide spread problem for
their member schools. Byer’s explains the NCAA’s response to the Nemeth ruling, “We crafted
the term student-athlete, and soon it was embedded in all NCAA rules and interpretations as a
mandated substitute for such words as players and athletes. We told college publicists to speak of
‘college teams,’ not football or basketball ‘clubs,’ a word common to the pros.” 86 This move was
obviously a success for the NCAA. The term was embraced by both the media and the public.
The simplicity is almost brilliant. How can anyone deny athletes are not students first, it clearly
says they are in the name. Murray Sperber points out that this is merely a semantic trick to hide
the fact that athletes are in fact employees brought to campus solely to generate revenue for
universities. 87
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In 1956, the NCAA officially relented, and allowed its member institutions to pay all
educational related expenses for intercollegiate athletes, regardless of their financial aid needs or
academic standing. 88 Ironically, this decision is said to be made in the name of amateurism.
Allen Sack and Ellen Staurowsky suggest that “the concept of amateurism had become a
convenient label that the NCAA could arbitrarily define to suit their needs.” 89 The reasoning for
this claim is rather obvious; any organization that had previously viewed any type of payment as
a violation of its most sacred principle, and then suddenly decides it can allow some payments,
but not others, can and should rightly be labeled as hypocrites. The arbitrariness of what
constitutes an acceptable benefit and what is a violation depends wholly on a small enforcement
staff in Indianapolis. Those who question the motives of the NCAA have remarked that the
organization, which was originally founded to prevent football injuries, has evolved into an
institution which seeks to restrict the amount of compensation athletes can receive for their
services. 90
Student-athletes, who of course are students first, were now being remunerated to attend
institutes of higher learning because they excel athletically; whether or not they are academically
prepared for college level course work is neither here nor there. Proponents of awarding full
grant-in aid scholarships claimed this would help to clean up intercollegiate sports; leveling the
playing field and ending illicit payments and other forms of cheating associated with enticing
athletes to attend specific institutions. 91 It was quite the opposite that turned out to be true
however, as evidenced by anyone familiar with the Southwest conference from the 1960’s to the
88
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1980’s could attest. 92 Walter Byers describes the actual result, “the NCAA, in effect, had put in
place a nationwide money-laundering scheme.” 93 Byers was referring to how the arrangement of
illicit payments had been altered. The subsidization of athletes prior to 1956 primarily occurred
by boosters or alumni paying the players expenses directly, or giving the family money, now,
they can give all their money directly to the institution, who in turn can give it to the players. 94
The money now can legally flow into the institution, but it is prohibited to give it directly to the
athletes.
Allen Sack and Ellen Staurowsky identify the two main problems stemming from the
new professional element of the NCAA. First, being recruited primarily as athletes, there is a
high possibility that some of these individuals will lack the motivation or requisite skills required
to succeed in a college classroom. 95 The other problem is the inordinate level of control coaches
now possess over the athletes in their program. 96 By allowing contracted grants-in-aid, the only
way the athlete can continue their education is by remaining on their athletics team. 97 If the
athlete decides he needs time off from his sport to focus on school, he can have his scholarship
revoked, thus ending his educational pursuit. There were two attempts to revert back to some
resemblance of the amateur ideal thought to exist in the NCAA prior to 1956; only offering need
based grant-in-aids, however, these measures were defeated by NCAA member schools in 1976,
and again in 1981. 98 Professionalism had permeated throughout college sports, and it is now
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enmeshed in every aspect of the university athletic program.
Many, such as George Sage, see the NCAA scholarship as nothing more than a
“conspiracy to hold down athletes’ wages.” 99 Prior to 1967, scholarships could not be pulled
from players who were injured or who decided they no longer wished to participate in athletics;
they functioned more as gifts to athletes, meaning usually they were a four year guarantee. 100 In
1967, schools, citing players accepting aid and quitting their teams made a push for one-year
renewable grants. This failed initially, but in 1973, the Association put a ban on four-year
guaranteed grants-in-aid. 101 Schools were now not simply given the option between one year
renewable grants or a four year guaranteed arrangement, they were prohibited from providing the
latter. This prohibition makes perfect sense for the cartel; if one school can provide a better more
secure offer in the form of a four-year guaranteed grant-in-aid scholarship, they will have an
advantage over other schools offering only a one-year guaranteed grant-in-aid scholarship in the
competition among athletes.
This was a big step for the NCAA member institutions, and one many wish was still in
place. The four-year grant-in aid ban gave a coach supreme control over his athletes. They could
now run-off, dismiss or fire athletes for any reason they deemed fit; injuries, attitudes, lack of
commitment to the program, recruiting mistakes, or players who were recruited by other coaches
that do not fit the new coaches system. 102 An athlete’s athletic skills may be their only chance at
earning a college degree, but a coaching change can mean new athletes with different skill sets
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are required to execute the incoming system, making those currently on the roster expendable. 103
By strictly controlling the movements of their unacknowledged workers, colleges function less
like amateur endeavors and more like athletic indentured servitude. 104
In 2012, the ban on four-year scholarships was lifted. Member schools voted 205-125 to
keep the ban in place (62.1%) but fell short of the 62.5% supermajority required to keep it. 105
Few schools provide the four-year guarantees, the University of Florida, Auburn University, and
a majority of universities in the Big Ten conference all offer four-year grants, but powerhouses
like the University of Alabama, Louisiana State University, and the University of Texas all voted
to keep the ban in place. 106
The 1960’s also saw revived talk of athletes as employees. Once again, the NCAA skirted
disaster by using semantics to complete an end-run around common sense. 107 In 1963, a
California court ruled a deceased player, Edward Gary Van Horn, was an employee of his
institution based on his athletics grant-in-aid. 108 The court claimed that because Van Horn’s
scholarship was at least partly awarded due to his athletic ability, he was contractually employed
by the university. 109
At this time, some schools were currently providing only one-year renewable grants, they
were often reassuring athletes that their scholarship would remain so long as they continued to
play. 110 Fearing this language could be interpreted as an employment contract, Walter Byers and
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Co. drafted a document sent to all member institutions explaining how to properly word grantsin-aid so as to make them appear less like a contract; “This award is made in accordance with the
provisions of the constitution of the [NCAA] pertaining to the principles of amateurism, sound
academic standards, and financial aid to student athletes… Your acceptance of this award means
that you agree with these principles and are bound by them.” 111
Growth of college football increased in a big way during this decade, helped in large part
to the death of one-way football. 112 With players no longer playing on both sides of the ball, it
opened the door for specialized players and coaches at every position; squads grew from
reasonable numbers to one-hundred-forty players and fifteen to seventeen coaches. 113 It was not
uncommon for football programs to sign in excess of fifty players each season, only keeping the
best twenty or thirty. 114 This growth made college sports teams much larger, and much more
expensive.
Continuing their string of input controls, the NCAA invented the national letter-of-intent,
which serves as a contract between the player and an institution, effectively ending their
recruitment. 115 After a player signs a national letter-of-intent, other schools are prohibited from
contacting them. While this is one function, they also serve to bind athletes to universities for
four years, yet the school, in most cases only is only bound to the athlete for one year. If a letterof-intent is signed, the athlete must attend that institution, or be granted a release from their
scholarship. Schools are not required to release athletes simply because they request it. The
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school has full discretion. 116 Attempts by athletes to be released from their scholarship are often
denied, or come with stipulations forbidding the player from attending certain institutions. 117
The amount of control a university can exercise over its athletes is absurd. Regarding
football, players must be twenty-one years of age or three years removed from high school to be
eligible for the National Football League (hereafter NFL) draft. 118 The reasoning is supposedly
that a player cannot physically compete in the NFL until they have reached this age, but this is
clearly not true of all players. Athletes have tried to challenge this arbitrary number in court, to
no avail. In 2004, two high profile athletes, Maurice Clarett from Ohio State University and
Mike Williams from the University of Southern California, attempted to petition the league for a
place in the NFL draft. Clarett had a stellar 2002 freshman season, but was ruled ineligible for
accepting money from a person he was not legally dependent on, an NCAA violation, and lying
to the NCAA about it. 119 Clarett took his case before the United States Supreme Court, where it
was denied. Williams, hoping for Clarett to be successful, declared for the draft without meeting
the age requirement, hoping he would be allowed in. At the time he was a potential first round
pick. 120 Concerning the NFL’s eligibility rules, Peter French remarks, “the three-year rule is an
utterly arbitrary rule designed by the NFL, in collusion with the universities, to protect its free
minor league, intercollegiate football.” 121

116

If a school is under penalty, athletes whose eligibility will run out before the school can compete in bowl
games are allowed to transfer to a new institution and the school cannot block the move.
117
As an example, see Robert Marv’s transfer restrictions imposed by the University of Miami here:
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=3806816. Also, Jarrod Uthoff’s restrictions imposed by the University
of Wisconsin here: http://sports.yahoo.com/blogs/ncaab-the-dagger/wisconsin-severely-restricts-forward-jarroduthoff-transfer-options-180208129.html.
118
There are very few exceptions to this rule.
119
Jay LaPrete, “Supreme Court Turns Down Clarett's Attempt to Enter NFL Draft,” USA Today, April 22,
2004, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/2004-04-22-clarett-decision_x.htm.
120
Ibid.
121
Peter French, Ethics and College Sports: Ethics, Sports, and the University (Lanham: Roman &
Littlefield, 2004), 49.

33
Along with rules governing player movement, the NCAA also places rules on academics.
Amid public concerns that the colleges had completely abandoned any academic mission, the
NCAA pulled off a brilliant public relations move enacting minimal admissions standards for
college athletes. 122 The move was perceived as restoring academic standards to a system that had
grown out of control chasing television dollars, but in reality it served as a very low academic
bar to allow athletes into college. In 1986, Prop 48 was enacted, requiring a combined 700 SAT
score or a 15 ACT score, along with a 2.0 GPA in eleven core classes. 123 Prop 48 has undergone
many changes over the years, but its content is unimportant. What is relevant here is the NCAA
governs all aspects of an athlete’s life, and uses strategic ploys and semantics to give the public
the impression that they actually care about the well-being of college athletes. The current
system is not concerned at all with the well-being of student athletes, athletically or
academically. It is designed to get what can be had out of an athlete athletically to boost
revenues, while encouraging them to do only what they have to in order to stay eligible in the
classroom. As soon as either of these cannot be attained, the athlete is pushed aside in favor of
another who will take his place.
This section explains how the Association became nationally relevant by creating an
enforcement mechanism to ensure adherence to the rules of intercollegiate sports. The first
NCAA penalty handed down to the University of Kentucky was a message received loud and
clear by other member schools; breaking rules would result in a penalty. The growth of college
sports is evidenced as well, with then president of the NCAA Walter Byers securing a lucrative
million dollar contract for the right to broadcast college football.
This time period also saw two major roadblocks to intercollegiate sports in the way of
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workers compensation claims levied against the NCAA. After the Nemeth case the Association
crafted the term student athlete to crystallize their stance that athletes are in fact students first. In
1956, the Association began to allow athletes to be recruited solely as potential college players,
regardless of their financial need situation. This signed agreement between the player and the
university serves as a contract binding the athlete to the school. These contracts had the
unforeseen side-effect of making college athletes clear employees of universities, according to
the courts. After the Van Horn case, the NCAA made sure to instruct all its member schools on
precisely how to word athletic grant-in-aid scholarships as to avoid making them seem like
employment contracts.
The move to allow grant-in-aid scholarships based solely on athletic ability created two
serious moral problems. First, it ensures that a great number of athletes who are recruited will
have little or no interest in academic pursuits. Athletes know they are being recruited to the
university to provide commercial entertainment, and serious scholastic endeavors often hinder
this goal. Second, it gave an inordinate amount of power to coaches in regard to the free
movements of athletes, further advancing already imbalanced power differentials. Beginning in
chapter seven, these two points will be utilized to explicitly show that college athletes are being
exploited in the current system of intercollegiate sports.
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Chapter 6: Antitrust Violations and Conference Realignment
In 1984, the Association was dealt a crushing blow by the Supreme Court, who, in a 7-2
decision, ruled the NCAA functioned as a cartel. The Court held the Association limited the
market on the number of available college football games that could be televised, which
inhibited consumer welfare, a violation of the Sherman Antitrust act. 124 The NCAA was also
charged with price-fixing; they had a set price for the rights fees of all games, regardless of the
number of carriers or the quality of the product. 125 The Court ended the NCAA’s television
monopoly, taking away their ability to sell the rights to college football, and leaving the
Association with a $2.2 million legal bill. 126
College football was an extremely valuable commodity by the 1980’s. The member
schools finally had enough of the NCAA dictated television schedule, and decided to break out
on their own. The NCAA had lost its most visible output control, but many still remain. The
Association is still in charge of the end of season basketball tournament, or March Madness, and
they sign the network deals and collect all money from this deal to redistribute among its
member schools. In 2010, the Association signed a ten-year, $10.8 billion deal with Turner
broadcasting and CBS Sports for the rights to televise March Madness. 127 Shortly after the Court
busted the football monopoly, the NCAA secured its first $1 billion rights deal with CBS, not a
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bad parting gift. 128 Fleischer, Goff, and Tollison argue that the NCAA, has “controlled both the
input and the output markets of college sports” and despite the setback in 1984, “continues to act
as a classic cartel by coordinating the pricing of the input services of players and paying them
less than the competitive market value for their services.” 129
After the Supreme Court ended the NCAA’s monopoly on college football, teams
received lower rights fees even though more games were being televised, a phenomenon that can
be explained by monopoly theory. Monopoly theory shows that the NCAA was artificially
lowering the output of college football games below what could be considered competitive
levels, while charging a price above competitive levels. 130 Networks were being required to pay
more for a less than competitive slate of games, and were not allowed to choose which games
received airtime. With the monopoly broken, the number of games that could be televised
increased substantially, and the revenue per game was lowered due to supply and demand of the
market. 131Today, television deals are typically negotiated by conferences on behalf of their
members. 132 Given that some conferences have better teams, thus more marketable brand names,
and some teams have excellent marketability and no conference affiliation, conference
realignment and expansion have exploded since 1990.
In 1991, there was an influx of formerly independent schools into the Big East
conference. 133 In 1992, former independent Florida State University joined the Atlantic Coast
conference (ACC), while the University of South Carolina and the University of Arkansas both
relocated to the Southeastern conference (SEC). In 1993, Penn State University joined the Big
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Ten conference. 134 These types of moves became the norm, and the college landscape is
constantly being reshaped each year. Most conferences are being re-drawn to chase football
dollars, as the Big East was in the early 1990’s. Recently, the Big East conference was on the
verge of adding Boise State University and San Diego State University among others, but the
seven Catholic institutions that make up the original Big East members had enough. 135 These
seven schools were unhappy with the constant pursuit of football dollars, which had now resulted
in conference members who resided on the other side of the country, and decided to leave the
Big East to form their own conference. These moves highlight the big business college sports
have become.
The initial purpose of a conference was to foster regional rivalries, and to bring NCAA
governance to the local level. 136 This early aspect has certainly been lost. Conferences now
function as homes for programs chasing large dollars, and the constantly changing landscape of
college football has devastated some great rivalries. One such casualty occurred in the 2011
season, when the University of Nebraska left the Big 12 conference for greener pastures in the
Big Ten, severing ties with their long-time rivals the University of Colorado, who had also fled
the Big 12 that year to join the Pac-12 (formerly Pac-10) conference. 137
Not all teams rely on their conference to negotiate their television deals. The University
of Texas, collaborating with ESPN, created The Longhorn Network, devoted entirely to the
University of Texas intercollegiate sports teams. It is a 20-year deal, with Texas receiving $10.98
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million dollars a year, and a three percent annual increase. 138 When ESPN recuperates its initial
$295 million dollar investment, Texas will receive 70% of the profit. 139 These cases all highlight
the bottom-line for college sports, make money. Boise State University (located in Idaho) and
San Diego State University (located in California) were both willing to be members of a
conference centered on the East coast, a sure logistics nightmare.
College sports have grown into a multi-billion dollar business, and there is more than
enough money to go around; unless of course, you happen to be one of the thousands of studentathletes who make generating the money possible, then you may only be paid what is deemed
permissible by the NCAA.
In this chapter, we saw that anti-trust violations cost the NCAA broadcasting rights to
college football; however they still retained the rights to the end of season men’s college
basketball tournament, which provides a multi-billion dollar revenue stream. The ruling by the
courts that the NCAA was a cartel provided new opportunities for athletic conferences; giving
them the ability to secure television rights deals for their members. More successful and thus
more profitable conferences saw their memberships increase and the college sports landscape is
often reshuffled on an annual basis. Teams now change conferences to seek out more lucrative
revenue shares, and this creates numerous problems for both classic conference rivalries and for
the athletes that have to deal with less than ideal travel conditions. With schools traveling greater
distances to meet scheduling requirements, athletes are taken away from the classroom for
longer, more extended periods of time.
138
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Chapter 7: The Problem of Academic and Financial Exploitation
The problem with college sports, especially in men’s Division I football and basketball, is
that athletes are currently being financially and academically exploited due to amateur rules and
restrictions created by universities and enforced by the NCAA. 140 The case is not very difficult to
make when one is presented with the facts. Division I football and basketball players can spend
anywhere from thirty to sixty hours a week devoted to their sport, generate millions of dollars for
their school, and many will not benefit in any real way from the educational product they
receive, assuming they graduate. 141 The reasoning here is that even if the athlete does manage to
graduate, they are commonly pushed into majors that are not very academically demanding or
rewarding.
The graduation rates for student athletes are lower than the graduation rate of all students
at most institutions. There are exceptions. Stanford University graduates 96% of all students, and
97% of its student athletes. 142 Graduation rates are calculated in two ways, the federal graduation
rate (FGR) and the graduation success rate (GSR). Per the NCAA website, the GSR’s were
created at the request of university presidents to reflect the academic standing of transfer students
more accurately. 143 The GSR’s could be understood another way however. Some view this as a
cleverly worded public relations statement to mask the true intent of the GSR’s;
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The Graduation Success Rate is the percentage of athletes who graduated within six years
after starting college, with an important exception – outgoing transfers and other
departures don't count in the calculation, so long as they were in good academic standing
when they left. Ignoring outgoing transfers has the predictable effect of making
graduation rates look higher than they were under the old method. Of course, making
graduation rates look higher without having to actually change anything was the whole
point of the GSRs. 144
At many institutions, GSR’s drastically improve graduation rates, as seen in Table 1.
Table 1- Graduation Rates 2010-2011
College
All
Student
Students Athletes
Florida
South Carolina
Miami (Florida)
UCLA
California (Berkley)
Oregon
USC
Florida State
Texas
Oklahoma
Wisconsin
Michigan

84%
70%
78%
90%
90%
66%
90%
74%
81%
68%
83%
90%

58%
58%
54%
79%
68%
53%
63%
58%
71%
63%
73%
81%

GSR
Football
75%
55%
94%
62%
48%
60%
57%
55%
58%
47%
65%
69%

FGR
Football
49%
44%
72%
51%
47%
54%
48%
45%
58%
38%
51%
59%

GSR
Basketball
17%
58%
87%
70%
50%
85%
43%
57%
71%
71%
40%
64%

FGR
Basketball
6%
30%
53%
54%
36%
90%
18%
33%
33%
45%
33%
58%

Source: “Academics”, National Collegiate Athletic Association,
2013, http://fs.ncaa.org/Docs/newmedia/public/rates/index.html.
This table is a random collection of university graduation rates. 145 The GSR numbers
inflate the true federal graduation rates. The numbers of student athletes that graduate are on
average lower than the number of all students, but the rates for football and basketball, the
revenue producing sports, are abysmally low. Many claim that a free education in exchange for
playing a game is an excellent deal, but when forty to sixty percent of athletes are not graduating,
how can this be considered a fair deal? If the athlete does not earn the degree, the school still
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benefits from their talents.
With a never-ending supply of athletes, no athlete is irreplaceable. Some will generate
more revenue than others, but there will always be a continued pipeline of elite athletic talent.
The welfare of the individual is ignored. Universities seek to gain all they can from an athlete for
as long as they can, and when they can no longer help you win, they are discarded. Neither the
NCAA nor the universities care if the athlete graduates. The system is not designed to be
concerned with the long-term success of any athlete, it merely seeks to get as much out of them
as can be had while it can be had. The consequence of this is a substantial number of athletes that
enter the system with lofty goals that go unfulfilled, who in the end finish with no professional
prospects and no degree. Graduation rates show how few actually finish the process of
completing a course of study, and those that do hardly excel in this undertaking. If the media and
public begin to talk about low graduation rates, the Association can artificially raise them with
things like the GSR, which increase graduation rates instantly.
At certain institutions, the educational product being given to all students is subpar to say
the least. An administrator from a university in the Sun Belt Conference claims:
We certainly can’t give our students a quality degree–not with class size growing
geometrically and 30-to-1 faculty/student ratio–but at least we can encourage students to
have fun, and identify with our teams while they’re here. . . . Football Saturdays are great
here and so are winter basketball nights. In our admissions office literature, we’ve
stopped saying that we provide a good education-our lawyers warned us that we could get
sued for misrepresentation–but we sure promote our college sports teams. 146

This statement appears in Murray Sperber’s work, “Onward to Victory,” and is used to explain
the powerful affect athletics can have in a university setting. Sperber claims that intercollegiate
athletics has become a tool universities utilize to entertain college students, a pleasant
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distraction, and to bring more tuition dollars into the university. 147 Athletics programs are the
most visible part of a university, and the average student would like to attend an institution that
offers a fun social life; athletics fills this role. Institutions of higher learning are supposed to
stand for honor and integrity, yet this quote makes one want to condemn this particular university
as frauds or dissemblers. The truth is this problem is not confined to one school in the Sun Belt
conference; it is a nationwide concern that contributes to the exploitation of college athletes.
The problem of exploitation is very damaging to the psyche of college athletes. Gary
Funk discusses the effects of elite athletes being given handouts and constantly being told not to
worry about their educational priorities, “It is here that the term exploitation is so appropriate.
Athletic programs, whose survival depends on the actions of a few gifted athletes, often help to
create illusions and priorities that are detrimental to the healthy, productive life of the individual
participant.” 148 Funk is describing the way in which university athletic programs seek to
deemphasize every aspect of a player’s life, except for their sport and the potential millions that
await them at the professional level. Athletes are told the way to achieve financial success is on
the field, not in the classroom.
The problem of financial exploitation is the most pressing matter, as commercialization
within intercollegiate athletics increases, so do revenues going to institutions, while athlete
compensation remains minimal. 149 The current system functions to allow the rich to become
richer and the poor remain stagnant. The amount of money currently involved in college sports is
obscene. Simply put, concerning Division I football and basketball, university athletic
departments generate millions of dollars a year off the athletic talents of young men who receive
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nowhere near a commensurate wage to what they produce.
The case of exploitation is most clearly made utilizing a formula created by Karl Marx,
explained here by Andrew Kliman, who writes “to quantify the degree of exploitation, Marx
takes the ratio of surplus-value, s, to variable capital, v. The result, s/v, is what he calls the rate
of surplus value or rate of exploitation.” 150 Applying this theory to college sports, “s” is the
amount of money a team makes, or their profit, and “v” is the amount of payment the players
receive, or their full-ride scholarship. 151
Table 2- Top Ten Revenue Producing Football Programs 2011-2012 Season
College
Football Revenue
Football Expenses
Expense Per Player
Texas
$103,813,684
$25,896,203
$42,010
Michigan
$85,209,247
$23,640,337
$46,082
Alabama
$81,993,762
$36,918,963
$40,411
Auburn
$77,170,242
$33,334,595
$32,273
Georgia
$74,989,418
$22,710,140
$50,788
Florida
$74,117,435
$23,045,846
$52,395
Notre Dame
$68,986,659
$25,757,968
$44,623
Louisiana State
$68,804,309
$24,049,282
$23,071
Penn State
$66,210,503
$30,206,692
$23,632
Arkansas
$64,193,826
$24,325,173
$50,704
Source: “The Equity in Athletics Data Analysis Cutting Tool,” U.S. Department of
Education, 2013, http://ope.ed.gov/athletics/index.aspx.
Table 2 above lists the top ten revenue generating football programs from the 2011-2012
football season. These athletic department financial numbers are required to be self-reported
annually by all colleges and universities that receive Title IX federal funding under the Equity in
Athletics Disclosure act. 152 It is important to reiterate these numbers are self-reported by
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individual institutions, and there are no uniform accounting practices embraced by all schools. 153
Nevertheless, big-time programs clearly are generating large amounts of revenue, and none of
this money is finding its way into the hands of those who make college athletics possible, the
players.
Table 3- Rate of Exploitation for College Football Players
College
Rate of Exploitation
Texas
247,116%
Michigan
184,907%
Alabama
202,899%
Auburn
239,117%
Georgia
147,651%
Florida
141,458%
Notre Dame
154,598%
Louisiana State
298,228%
Penn State
280,279%
Arkansas
126,605%
The figures in Table 3 show the rate of exploitation of football players at the institutions
listed in Table 2 according to Marx’s “s/v” formula. For Marx, the goal would be to eliminate
these percentages, thus removing the exploitation. As evidenced by Table 3, college football
players currently are being exploited at very high rates. If Marx is correct in his understanding of
exploitation, then it is apparent the labor of college athletes is being unfairly taken advantage of
by those whom are tasked with looking out for their well-being.
One might object that athletes consent to the current system of intercollegiate athletics as
a necessary condition to pursue careers as professional athletes. They are taking a risk, and
moving through the college system imposes certain burdens they must carry on their road to
financial success in the pros. This may be true for the elite athlete (a miniscule percentage) but
for the average college athlete (the overwhelming majority) they have no chance to make it to the
professional level. The objection would contend these are the athletes who benefit in the form of
153

Zimbalist, Unpaid Professionals, 153.

45
a valuable college education. As evidenced by the graduation rates in Table 1, this simply is not
the case. Even if the athlete does benefit, they are still being unfairly exploited.
For those who are still unconvinced the athlete is being exploited, let us ask if the current
system of intercollegiate sports is fair. Fairness here is best understood as explained by John
Rawls. The Rawlsian conception of fairness requires that individuals uphold their obligations
within a just cooperative system, voluntarily abiding by agreed upon rules which will restrict
their autonomy to a certain degree but will yield benefits for all. 154 No one should benefit from
the labor of others unless they have completed their fair share, satisfying their obligations. 155
Essential here is the fact that the institution in question must be just. Rawls contends that if the
institution is in fact unjust, an agent is not bound to the rules of this institution. 156
Concerning the NCAA, we can determine if it is a just institution by utilizing the
Rawlsian hypothetical original position. The original position is designed to lead rational actors
to create a just system. 157 To ensure that all are equal in the original position, not guided by
perceived advantage, prejudice or bias, the veil of ignorance is invoked meaning each actor will
not know what capacity they will fill in the system. 158 For our purposes, this means all potential
actors in the current system, be it university presidents and athletic directors to third-string
football bench players, will elucidate a fair arrangement that all can agree to without knowing
what role they will fill in the system. 159
The benefit here is that all parties will want a fair system, because they would not want to
be disadvantaged by unjust rules if they happen to be in a less well-off situation. If for instance,
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the president of the NCAA were to enter the original position under the veil of ignorance, he
would likely not choose the current arrangement as a just system of intercollegiate athletics. The
reasoning would be that he very well may end up being an athlete from a low socioeconomic
background who is currently underprepared for college level courses and overworked on the
field. He could in fact be an elite athlete who generates millions for his university, but is unable
to receive any of this money due to NCAA rules and he has no real chance of attaining a
worthwhile degree, which is allegedly his reward for all his hard work on the playing field. As
indicated by low graduation rates, this is a very real possibility.
A fair arrangement that is constructed from the original position would include equal
opportunities for all actors. If coaches and university higher-ups enjoy free movement without
penalty, it would seem fair to extend this privilege to the athletes as well. The current system of
course does not offer this benefit to athletes in revenue producing sports. The original position
would also call for a more equitable distribution of the wealth generated by the athletes who play
the games. Currently, they are provided tuition, room and board, and other incidentals associated
with the pursuit of a college degree, while coaches and athletic directors receive multi-million
dollar compensation packages. This large disparity in remuneration would not be accepted by
rational actors functioning behind the veil of ignorance. There is nothing unreasonable about
wanting to be fairly compensated for one’s labor, and Rawls’ understanding of fairness forbids
agents from benefiting from the labor of others when they have not done their fair share. We do
not necessarily need equality, according to Rawls, but institutions must comply with the
principle of fairness to be considered just.
Here, one could argue coaches may have a case for receiving large financial
compensation packages. They are the designers of game plans and are tasked with teaching
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athletes to properly execute plays. However, the athletes would have an equally valid case to be
paid large financial compensation packages. They are, after all, the ones tasked with executing
the coach’s plays. A brilliant coach with untalented athletes is likely to lose more often than win,
and will eventually be unemployed. The talent and hard work of the athletes is integral to the
success of the coach. If the coach is highly paid because he is a winner, it stands to reason the
athletes should be compensated accordingly to the role they play in his success.
By utilizing Rawls’ original position and veil of ignorance, it is evident that the current
arrangement is unjust. Rational beings who are seeking a fair arrangement of intercollegiate
athletics would not choose the current system. Those who work the hardest to generate benefits
for all involved are in fact receiving the least amount of benefits in return. Those who are
benefitting the most are in positions of authority, the NCAA executives and university higherups, far removed from the labor product that actually generates the revenue they enjoy so much.
These actors play a role in the system, yet they are being benefitted in ways that are highly
disproportionate to the contributions they make, an unjust system according to a Rawlsian
understanding of fairness.
This discussion of fairness leads to a different understanding of exploitation. Marx’s
theory allowed for exploitation to be quantified, but this is not the only way we can conceive of
the term. Chris Myers has developed a theory known as beneficent exploitation, which claims “it
is possible for someone to be wrongly exploited even if that person benefits from the exploitation
and even if the person prefers the exploitation over all other options.” 160 Myers understands
exploitation in terms of fairness. 161 For our purposes, beneficent exploitation refers to the fact

160

Chris Myers, "Wrongful Beneficence: Exploitation and Third World Sweatshops," Journal of Social
Philosophy 35, no. 3 (Fall 2004): 320.
161
Ibid.

48
that colleges and universities are benefiting from the labor of college athletes disproportionately.
Looking at the numbers from Table 2 and the percentages in Table 3 this becomes clear.
Beneficent exploitation fits the current plight of college athletes. Even those football and
basketball players that earn degrees, which is a benefit, are being exploited by a broken system.
Universities make millions from the talent of athletes, and do not offer anything close to a fair
wage for their highly valuable workforce. If we understand exploitation in this way, one can see
the intercollegiate athletic system is in desperate need of reform. Peter French criticizes the
current system, stating that college athletes are “being treated as mere means to an end from
which they only marginally benefit, if at all.” 162 French is invoking the Kantian principle of
respect for persons here, arguing that the current system fails to respect the rational nature of the
players.
An objection one could lobby would be that college athletes are like any other employeeemployer relationship, where the employee agrees to perform services for a settled on wage, thus
not using the employee as a mere means. 163 French however contends that this is not what is
occurring in the current intercollegiate athletic system. Athletes, according to the NCAA and its
member institutions, are not employees of the university; they are allegedly students who happen
to compete in athletic competition for the university. 164 The NCAA has fought numerous court
battles to ensure their athletes are not considered employees of the university. For French, under
a Kantian understanding of respect for persons, the athletes have a right to be fully informed of
the goals of coaches and athletic departments who recruit them, as well as the right not be used
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in ways the athletes would not consent to. 165 Athletes are not being coerced to sign with college
programs, but there is deception involved. Bait-and-switch tactics are common among recruiters,
or the practice of selling one picture of an athletic program to a recruit when the reality is far
different.
In the current system of intercollegiate athletics, athletes are not informed in this manner.
They are not aware of the coaches’ true intentions for them as players, nor of the coaches’ true
intentions regarding his future employment. If a coach were to recruit an elite athlete and inform
them that the university planned to make millions of dollars from their athletic prowess, and to
then use this money to pay large compensation packages to the program’s coaches and athletic
department executives, while the athlete gets the bare minimum to survive and has roughly a
fifty percent chance to graduate, athletes may no longer want to participate in this system.
Athletes can never expect to be fully informed, but these facts seem simple enough to disclose,
and may have a drastic effect on whether or not the athlete wishes to involve himself in this
arrangement.
Walter Byers, the first president of the Association and the man responsible for building
the current system, argues aptly just before leaving office in1985, that athletes need to have the
same opportunities coaches enjoy in terms of the free market. He claims they should be able to
endorse products and capitalize off their own celebrity on account of the exploitation they
currently endure at the hands of the system. 166 The money they generate through these endeavors
could be placed in a trust for the athlete after their collegiate career has come to an end or they
graduate. 167 This was a novel idea in 1985, and also the reason Byers has fallen out of the good
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graces of the Association. By placing any earnings in a trust, athletes would not simply mirror
the professional model, which so many fear. Had this been implemented, perhaps the situation
would not be as dire as it is now. Given the current landscape of college sports, this indeed
should be implemented, however, simple fairness demands more. Players deserve a piece of the
revenues they produce for their universities.
Instead, we have a system that rewards already wealthy coaches and athletic directors by
taking the surplus generated from the exploited athletes and paying these groups well in excess
of the value they produce. 168 The compensation currently provided to athletes is the same for
elite players and marginal role players, a clear sign of collusion to keep player costs down. The
true beneficiaries of athletic scholarships are students that compete in nonrevenue producing
sports; they commit much less required time to their sports and graduate at much higher
levels. 169 As an example, recall the FGR and GSR graduation percentages from the University of
Florida football (FGR 49%, GSR 75%) and basketball (FGR 6%, GSR 17%) programs and
compare these numbers to Florida’s women’s volleyball team (FGR 100%, GSR 100%). 170
Concerning exploitation, the athletes in revenue producing sports are the ones that are being
harmed the most by the present system.
Roger Noll explains that for athletes who have no interest in academics, “the
‘scholarship’ received by the athlete is essentially valueless, except insofar as it gives him four to
five years of training, medical attention, and room and board while he prepares for his shot at
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professional sports.” 171 Why would an institute of higher learning be willing to admit a student
with zero academic interests while funding their room, board and tuition? Why would these
institutions continually serve as the unofficial, uncompensated minor league for the NFL? The
answer is that in these athletes who have no academic interests, colleges have found a gold mine.
These players will generate massive amounts of revenue, while colleges only have to pay them
pittance and not be concerned about the quality of education provided, as the athlete has no
interest in erudition. Former Iowa State football coach Jim Walden has been quoted as saying,
“not more than 20 percent of football players go to college for an education. And that may be a
high figure.” 172
Statements like this do not shock the public, or if they do the shock factor does not last.
How is it that this broken system continues to function relatively unmolested? We know a
substantial number of these young men do not have any academic interests, yet we force them to
put on a show, thus affording the public the opportunity to villainies them when they mess up
this golden opportunity generously provided to them by the NCAA. College is not for everyone.
In fact, a substantial number of the population does not attain a college degree. The NFL is the
only business that effectively requires an individual to attend college but does not require them
to obtain a degree. 173
This is less of a problem in basketball, as there are other viable opportunities for players
only seeking a professional career. The National Basketball Association (NBA) used to allow
high school players to jump straight from high school to the professional ranks. Many players
made a seamless transition in this endeavor, such as LeBron James, Kobe Bryant, and Kevin
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Garnett. Some struggled, never reaching their full potential, like Kwame Brown. To respond to
this crisis (that was not actually a crisis) of players not succeeding, the NBA enacted what has
been deemed the one-and-done-rule in 2006, requiring a player to be one year removed from
high school to be eligible for the NBA draft. Many players attend college for essentially one
semester and declare for the draft. They can manage an easy course load and hone their skills
until it is time to make the jump.
However, there is another option. Some athletes, like Brandon Jennings, spend this one
season playing in other professional leagues, often overseas. This gives them the opportunity to
earn a decent wage while testing their skills against professional talent. The NBA instituted an
arbitrary admission requirement which has benefited colleges for the most part. Players like John
Wall, who attended the University of Kentucky and Derrick Rose who attended the University of
Memphis likely would not have attended these institutions if they were allowed to jump directly
to the professional ranks. Without these two players, their respective teams may not have made
such deep runs in the NCAA tournament, which earn both the university and the coach more
dollars. 174
The fact is athletes should be free to pursue careers as professionals without having to
pretend they are interested in obtaining a college degree. 175 George Sage describes the situation
the NCAA has created in cohorts with its member institutions, “stripped of the rhetoric used to
convince athletes and the public that athletic scholarships are philanthropic ‘free rides’ and that
athletes are living the best of all possible worlds, the NCAA scholarship is first and foremost a
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conspiracy to hold down athletes’ wages.” 176 Sage goes on to describe how athletes are trapped
in the grasps of the NCAA cartel, unable to sell their athletic talents on the free market to the
highest bidder. 177
This chapter makes several arguments for ways in which athletes are currently being
exploited by the NCAA and its member institutions. Academically speaking, graduation rates for
athletes in the two main revenue producing sports are on average significantly lower than that of
all students. The NCAA, at the request of athletic directors created the GSR’s to give the
impression that student athletes were graduating at higher rates than indicated by the original
FGR standard. Also, information is presented that highlights how poor the educational product
offered by many schools actually is, and for those athletes that do manage to graduate, their
course of study is not typically a very demanding or rewarding educational pursuit. The revenue
seeking universities create a flawed sense of priorities for many athletes, allowing them to
believe they have a shot at securing a lucrative professional contract, when in reality only about
three percent of these players has a realistic chance to achieve this. Athletes that do not make it
to the professional ranks end up with a degree that will not aid them in future employment
opportunities or worse still, without any degree at all.
Financially speaking, the amount of revenue produced in college sports is incredible, yet
this money is not finding its way back to those who make generating it possible. Utilizing the s/v
Marxist formula to quantify the rate of exploitation at the top ten revenue producing football
programs the financial exploitation inherent in the current system is apparent. For many jobs,
rates of exploitation according to Marx’s theory can be high, but few other endeavors create
percentages as high as those seen in intercollegiate revenue producing sports.
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To rectify this, a case is presented for simple fairness in the arrangement of
intercollegiate sports. Using a Rawlsian account of justice as fairness, it becomes clear that no
rational actor would agree to the current terms of the system when we invoke the original
position thought experiment coupled with the veil of ignorance. The current system is not just,
and thus actors cannot be bound by the rules of the game as fairness would dictate.
For those athletes that do manage to graduate, Chris Myers’s beneficent exploitation
shows that it is possible to be benefitted by an arrangement that one enters into freely and still be
exploited. This occurs when one group, namely coaches, athletic directors, and the NCAA
disproportionately benefit in a collaborative effort. During the recruiting process, athletes are
often exposed to bait and switch tactics, where recruiters distort reality and conceal vital
information to secure recruits commitments to athletic programs. This shows a clear lack of
respect for persons in the Kantian sense. Athletes in revenue producing sports simply are not
getting the deal sold to them during the recruiting process. Athletics are the most visible part of a
university, and yet far too many are ignorant of the inherent exploitation in college sports.
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Chapter 8: The Truth about Intercollegiate Athletics
The numbers do not lie; college sports are designed to make money. 178 The evidence put
forth so far is convincing; college sports are big business. The NCAA, functioning as a cartel
has, in conjunction with its member institutions, succeeded in building an empire in college
sports specializing in exploiting the talent of young men for financial gain. Functioning as a
business, the system attempts to achieve maximum gain at minimal cost, which is made much
easier by the tax breaks afforded to both the Association and its member institutions that are in
name non-profit groups. 179 Former Association head Walter Byers describes the situation:
Today, the NCAA Presidents Commission is preoccupied with tightening a few loose
bolts in a worn machine, firmly committed to the neo-plantation belief that enormous
proceeds from college games belong to the overseers (the administrators) and supervisors
(coaches). The plantation workers performing in the arena may receive only those
benefits authorized by the overseers. 180
This damning indictment comes from a very credible source. Byers, who is a major
contributor to the current system, has since decided his creation is unjust. This is a reasonable
and apt assessment given the discussion of justice from chapter seven. He unfortunately made
this discovery when he no longer had the power to change the system. Because college sports
function as business, winning is and must be the primary goal. 181 When functioning as a
business, only winning programs generate maximum revenue. Coaches are evaluated by
professional standards (win-loss records) but they must operate within the confines of amateur
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rules. 182 The fact is that coaches who run clean programs and graduate students at high levels
simply do not last, especially at elite universities. Smaller schools may tolerate losing for a time,
but will not keep a coach that cannot put a winner on the field. The dilemma for a head coach is
simply this; run a clean program in an ethical manner, weighting appropriately the demands of
both the coursework and the practice time of your athletes, and you will be disadvantaged
because most programs focus all of their time on the latter. 183
Allen Sack argues the problem is not that the university is in the business of mass
commercial entertainment; it’s that they refuse to acknowledge it. 184 He writes, “professional
sport in academia need not produce the corruption, exploitation, and unethical conduct which
have prompted so much criticisms and debate over the years.” 185 By admitting the primary goal
in Division I athletic endeavors is to make money, universities can end the hypocrisy, deception,
and exploitation we currently find in college sports. Admitting this would require changes in
player compensation, as they would clearly be viewed as employees of the university recruited to
provide commercial entertainment. Unfortunately, they have no incentive to give up the charade.
The public has been brainwashed by the NCAA to believe college sports are simply supported
and played for the love of the game, and anyone who breaks the Association’s rules is corrupt;
attempting to destroy the sanctity and intrinsic goods involved in an amateur athletic pursuit.
Athletes are required, under the current arrangement, to succeed both in the classroom
and on the field. Failure in one area results in losing the other. A player who is excelling in
school, but failing on the field can have their scholarship revoked at any time, for any capricious,
arbitrary reason their coach can create. On the other hand, an athlete excelling on the field who
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fails their coursework is kicked off the team. The role of full time student and elite athlete are
often contradictory. 186 Athletes must, and are often expected to make sacrifices for their sport. 187
Athletes in the revenue producing sports are not encouraged to pursue their academic dreams, if
they indeed have any at all. They are told by coaches their focus needs to be on athletics first and
foremost; after all that is why they have an athletic scholarship to the university. To neglect your
athletic pursuits in favor of devoting more time to your intellectual pursuits can, at most
institutions, result in revocation of your scholarship, which in turn puts an end to your
intellectual pursuits.
This is not an exaggerated problem. Many athletes struggle with the mixed messages sent
from their coaches and the NCAA. One would refer to them as student-athletes, while the other
as athletes who also are required to be students. Many big-time college coaches ask that you only
achieve enough in the classroom to remain eligible for competition. If you can succeed in the
classroom with what little free time you have away from your sport, kudos to you. However, you
must remember that sports come first. Every season, many athletes are suspended from
competition for failing courses and dropping their GPA below what is minimally required. If one
of the goals of intercollegiate athletics is to foster the development of both athletic and
intellectual skills, why is this a re-occurring problem? If the system is designed to create both
excellent students and athletes, why do we then marvel at instances where this actually comes to
fruition?
In reality many do not expect much at all from athletes in the classroom. Murray Sperber
writes about the dichotomy faced by athletes who are attempting to reconcile the demands of
being a full-time athlete and a full-time student. This is what the current system requires. Far too
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many athletes neglect the latter, at the instruction of those tasked with looking out for their best
interests, their coaches. Sperber describes this phony curriculum athletes are pushed into as “a
school’s Division of Ridiculous Studies,” meaning courses that lack any meaningful educational
value. 188
It is difficult for any athlete to truly flourish in the present system. NCAA rules coupled
with an extremely demanding schedule, as Sperber points out, often contributes to an athlete
withdrawing from one of these roles in order to attempt to maximize their ability in the other.
The NCAA and their member institutions have made a habit of admitting students to college who
have no reasonable chance at prolonged success academically. Failure in the classroom when one
does not have the prerequisite skills to succeed is damaging on many levels, and cannot be
considered contributing to flourishing in any meaningful sense. If athletes can only realize their
full potential in one area, why does the NCAA require them to pursue both, something that could
lead to mediocre or failing results? The consequence of admitting underprepared athletes to
college and requiring them to undergo the activities of a full-time student while meeting the
training regiments of a professional athlete is setting them up for failure.
A less demanding academic or athletic schedule seems much more conducive to
flourishing and is less likely to set an individual up for failure. Currently, the revenue producing
sports in intercollegiate athletics do not create opportunities to flourish, but instead create an
atmosphere where failure is common, in some sense expected. If the well-being of the athlete
were of central concern to the powers that be, a less demanding schedule, either on the field or in
the classroom would be created. Perhaps athletes could be part-time students, or pursue degrees
after their playing days have come to an end. These options would force the NCAA and its
188
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member institutions to admit that college athletes are brought to universities to play sports
however, and they simply refuse to do this.
Many athletes enter college at a marked disadvantage academically. John Gerdy, in his
work, “Air Ball,” comments on a study that explains athletes have reported “being underprepared
and outperformed academically, overworked athletically, isolated in an athletic ‘womb,’ with
little money to enjoy anything close to a ‘normal’ life as a college student.” 189
The NCAA has restrictions limiting practice time for football at twenty hours per week;
however, Walter Byers explains these limitations are ineffective because coaches simply make
non-mandatory (mandatory) sessions. 190 Essentially, if you do not show up for these sessions,
you will see your playing time diminish and possibly not have your scholarship renewed for
disciplinary purposes. 191 Brandon Mitchell, a former Division II running back from a college in
the Patriot League conference described to me how this system operates. 192
In the fall, practices were held for 21 days before the other students arrived on campus
for the upcoming semester. Practice times alternated from three hours a day to six hours a day. It
was all football, all the time. Athletes typically got twelve hours to themselves a day during
camp, however there were no other students on campus to interact with. The practice limitation
rule was not explained to the athletes. When the semester began, Monday was a scheduled off
day. Tuesday through Thursday practice was held from 3:30 to 6:30, and athletes had to report to
the field by 3:00 for meetings. Friday’s practice was one hour shorter, with games on Saturday.
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If it was a road game, meetings were held Friday evening after practice.
Athletes were strongly encouraged to have all their classes early; missing team activities
for class would jeopardize an athlete’s playing time. Players were looked down on for taking
classes that conflicted with the team’s schedule. Brandon, a biology major, was told several
times by coaches and advisors that they do not recommend such a demanding major. Brandon
was a scholar athlete in high school, and a proven good student, however, they did not want him
to risk being overburdened by school work.
The weight-lifting schedule was to be done on the athletes own time, Monday through
Thursday before practice, or there was disciplinary action. Brandon found out after he graduated
this was in fact an NCAA violation. What is the purpose of a rule that cannot be enforced? It
gives the public the image that athletes are not being overworked. Starting players were also
expected to come to the facility to watch game and practice film once a week. For road trips, the
team would depart Friday evening after practice and film study. Longer trips required leaving
Friday morning, causing athletes to miss class.
Athletes were expected to do as they were told, and academics only received priority
when a player’s eligibility was becoming an issue. According to Brandon, “once you arrived,
they had you.” On top of such a busy schedule, freshmen were required to go to study hall three
days a week, from 8:00 to 10:00 during their first semester. If your grade point average was
lower than 3.0, you had to attend your whole first year. Sophomore’s also had to attend if they
had a 2.5 GPA or lower. While this seems like a great idea, it actually hurt those who wished to
take their studies seriously. Essentially there would be twenty-five freshman and fifteen
upperclassmen in a room with no supervision. He describes it as a hang out session as opposed to
a study hall. He would often have to go to the library after study hall to finish his course work.
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When players reported the difficult atmosphere to coaches, nothing was done to remedy
the situation. Off-season workouts were similarly taxing and time consuming. Athletes do agree
to these conditions, however, is it fair to call a full-time athlete who was recruited to play
football a student-athlete? This schedule was at a Division II school, where athletes could only
get need-based financial aid. Elite, nationally ranked programs run a much more difficult
schedule.
Some athletes take full advantage of the system. They go into college using athletics to
fund a degree of their choice, and gain something valuable from their experience. Many others
are not so lucky. Even under the Division II need-based model of financial aid, coaches are
expected to produce victories, and this means pushing athletes away from the classroom and onto
the field.
The current system of intercollegiate athletics is designed to make money from the
popularity of Division I men’s football and basketball. Because of this business oriented goal,
winning becomes a necessary and sufficient condition to financial success. The contradictory
roles of full-time student and full-time athlete create an atmosphere where athletes are expected
and in some cases required to make academic sacrifices in order to stay on scholarship. This
design flaw in the system stretches athletes too thin, and waters down the successful pursuit of a
degree for many college athletes. College football and basketball players are being set up for
failure, and their rigorous schedules prohibit them from truly flourishing during their time in
college. A close examination of Brandon Mitchell’s experience as a Division II athlete shows
that the NCAA cannot enforce practice limitations, as workouts that exceed the allotted twenty
hours a week are labeled voluntary, even though they are in reality required. Brandon’s case also
highlights that academic pursuits are not taken seriously by those in positions of power, and even
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when time is set aside for studying, there is no supervision to ensure progress is made. There is
always however a system of supervision and accountability to ensure athletic pursuits are not
neglected.
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Chapter 9: The Association’s Rules and Enforcements
The NCAA does not create legislation to govern college sports. Rules are proposed,
voted on, and passed by the Association’s member institutions. Once a rule has been adopted, the
NCAA is tasked with interpretation and enforcement. 193 The current NCAA rules manual is now
439 pages and growing, governing all interactions and relationships between student athletes and
coaches, as well as outside third parties. The biggest problem with such an expansive rule book
is no one bound to follow the rules (coaches and athletes) actually knows what they are. 194
Former division II running back Brandon Mitchell said soon after players arrive, there is a brief
discussion of common infractions players commit, but no formal discussion of the rules is given.
It is no surprise athletes and coaches do not know the rules that govern their lives, very
few could find the time to read such a document, and fewer still can actually grasp what is being
said. I have had the privilege of reading the manual, and one can lose hours and hours reading
rule after rule. Seemingly every possible scenario is discussed. Bylaw 13.1.9 is probably the
most disturbing;
Funeral/Memorial Services. An institutional staff member may attend the funeral or
memorial services of a student-athlete, a prospective student-athlete or a member of the
student-athlete’s or a prospective student-athlete’s immediate family, at which
prospective student-athletes also may be in attendance, provided no recruiting contact
occurs. The involved prospective student-athlete must have signed a National Letter of
Intent, or a written offer of admission and/or financial aid with the institution, or the
institution must have received a financial deposit in response to the institution’s offer of
admission. (Adopted: 4/28/05, Revised: 1/15/1, effective 8/1/11). 195
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Everything imaginable is covered by the Association rulebook. Sometimes, rules are proposed by
small schools trying to keep up with the big-time programs, others are from small occurrences
that disadvantage one school, so they create a rule to level the playing field. 196
It would appear rules are proposed and passed typically for one or two occurrences that
may or may not have taken place. Bylaw 13.9.1 looks like a prime example of this. A coach may
have attended a funeral and had a player commit to his program shortly after, so we now need a
rule regulating what can be said at a funeral. The overregulation has become absurd. Imagine this
scenario: A university professor is driving to campus, and spots a student with a broken down car
in the rain. The professor is polite enough to offer the student a ride to campus, no problem. If
the student is replaced with a basketball player whom the professor recognizes, providing
transportation would be an NCAA violation. 197 In 2010, University of Southern California
running back Dillon Baxter was suspended one game for catching a ride on a golf cart to
practice.
The only ones in this system without a voice are the athletes. NCAA rules are often cited
as looking out for the well-being of athletes. Ask Dillon Baxter if he agrees with this audacious
claim. Athlete welfare is of no concern to the NCAA. Their mission is to regulate any ridiculous
piece of legislation passed by its member institutions. The rules are supposed to make sure
athletes are treated like any other student, when in reality they encroach on every activity an
athlete partakes in, on and off campus. Former agent Mike Trope had this to say regarding
NCAA rules: “The NCAA rules are not the laws of the United States. They’re simply a bunch of
hypocritical and unworkable rules set up by the NCAA. I would no sooner abide by the rules and
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regulations of the NCAA than I would the Ku Klux Klan.” 198 The fact is there are too many
players, too many schools, and too many boosters and various other outsiders for the NCAA to
ever enforce anything evenhandedly and fairly. 199 Walter Byers admits to the NCAA’s limited
ability to effectively catch rule violators, asking if any organization could enforce constantly
changing, increasingly arbitrary rules. 200
The NCAA rule system has had a predictable effect. Lisa Kihl discusses how the
utilization of a stringent rulebook inhibits the use of practical morality, or the ability to properly
exercise moral judgments in practical cases. 201 Kihl conducted a study of ten compliance officers
in the Pac-12 Conference (Pacific 10 at the time) to understand how the compliance officers’
morally thought about their professional roles and responsibilities. 202 The study yielded some
interesting results.
One compliance officer disclosed a difficulty in admitting students who did not appear to
be academically ready for college level work, something not against NCAA rules, but something
the officer believed was morally problematic. 203 Another officer describes the difficulty in
relaying bad news, such as loss of eligibility, to players and coaches: “I guess that is where we
see the emotional or the ‘human’ side of the rules. I don’t believe that those issuing the rulings or
interpretations see that side.” 204 Oyvind Kvalnes and Liv Hemmestad explain the biggest pitfall
of rule based ethical approaches in sports is that the detailed list of rules tells actor’s there are no
more moral issues to sort through; all potential ethical decisions have already been decided and
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one simply has to follow the rule book. 205
One compliance officer in the Kihl study sums up precisely this sentiment: “What I try to
do in this job is to say the book is right, the book is right. I don’t have to make moral judgments
[hits rule book with hand]. What it says in the book is the way it is supposed to be. If it ain’t that
way then I have a problem.” 206 The comments of the compliance officers’ paint a very
problematic situation for the Association. We are left with loophole ethics, where individual
actors appeal to the fact they have not broken any rules through their conduct. 207 Citing the
annually growing NCAA manual as evidence, this approach just leads to more rules. If an action
is not expressly forbidden, then it is perceived as an acceptable act; when in fact each new case
may be cause for ethical reflection. Every situation is different, and this particular problem may
be a new issue that has not yet come up before, meaning silence from the rule book. 208 This is
especially pertinent because the lives and futures of innocent young athletes are hanging in the
balance, their fate being decided by the arbitrary commands of a distant, unaffected group.
This is precisely the worry with rule based approaches to ethical dilemmas. The NCAA
says the rules are the fault of their member institutions, claiming they do not make the rules,
while the member schools claim the NCAA is interpreting the rules they passed in the wrong
way. No one is being held accountable, insane rules are being passed and the athletes are
suffering.
Meanwhile, athletes accused of rules violations are guilty until proven innocent. 209 As
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soon as an athlete is implicated in any wrongdoing, rabid fan bases, and the media take the story
and run wild. If they have been accused, they surely have to be guilty! Even after an athlete is
cleared of wrong doing, the stigma remains because they typically are not fully vindicated,
simply not punished. Cam Newton’s case mentioned earlier highlights this point. For months
leading up to the NFL Draft, ESPN reported multiple times about the possible ramifications of
him being implicated in an attempted pay for play scenario.
When an athlete does actually break the Association’s rules, they are forever branded a
cheater. A.J. Green, former wide receiver for the University of Georgia, sold one of his game
worn jerseys in 2010 for $1,000. He was suspended four games. The NCAA discovered this
horrible transgression by investigating Green for attending a party in Miami, something they
discovered through the crack news agency, TMZ. 210 Upon finding out Green had not attended
the party, they asked for his bank records and discovered the $1,000 dollar deposit, and he told
them it came from selling one of his jersey’s. 211
The case of A.J. Green is ludicrous on every angle. How can an athlete be punished for
selling their own property? How can an organization initiate investigations from the findings of a
celebrity gossip column? The NCAA has an answer to these concerns. According to the
Association’s website, “the mission of the NCAA enforcement program is to reduce violations of
NCAA legislation and impose appropriate penalties if violations occur. The program is
committed to the fairness of procedures and to the timely and equitable resolution of infractions
cases.” 212 Also, “the enforcement staff receives information about possible violations from
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several different sources. Member institutions, media reports, confidential/anonymous sources
and other individuals all can provide information.” 213 I find these statements thoroughly
unconvincing.
The NCAA is well aware they can never effectively police all institutions under their
control. Given the number of current rules, they can reasonably assume there are violations at
just about every institution. As was the case with Green, any hint of wrongdoing and the
Association will show up and dig until a violation is found. The enforcement process is not even
handed. The NCAA lacks subpoena power, and cannot compel anyone outside its cooperative
principle (athletes, institutions and their employees) to provide a statement. 214 Agents, common
rule breakers, operate outside this principle and do not have to answer to anyone when they are
implicated in wrongdoing. Players and coaches can also escape the wrath of the Association by
going to the professional level, as Pete Carroll did before the University of Southern California
was hit hard with sanctions in 2010.
For this reason, sanctions that are applied to institutions often miss their intended target.
Referring back to USC, in an attempt to punish the school for violations that occurred six years
earlier, the school was placed on two-year bowl ban from 2010-2011, had to vacate wins, and
lost scholarships. 215 During the same time span the basketball program lost scholarships, got
limits on recruiting, and had to repay money received from a final four appearance because a
player accepted impermissible benefits. 216 These sanctions, meant to teach USC a lesson, only
worked in harming athletes who did not break NCAA rules. Players with postseason eligibility
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that extends beyond the ban cannot transfer to a new institution, unless the school decides to
release them from their scholarship.
Bylaw 13.1.1.3.3 and 13.1.1.3.4 limit the restrictions of athletes who can transfer from
sanctioned universities to only those who will run out of eligibility before the sanctions expire. 217
To their credit, USC released some recruits out of their scholarships, but they were by no means
required. 218 USC will violate Association rules again, as will all other universities. The only
people hurt by the penalties handed down by the NCAA are the athletes left in the wake of these
alleged scandals. Matt Barkley, former USC starting quarterback, missed opportunities to play in
bowl games his sophomore and junior seasons because the school was being punished for actions
that took place before he even arrived at the university.
In 1996, Marcus Camby was ruled ineligible for accepting money while playing
basketball at the University of Massachusetts Amherst. UMass had to vacate their tournament
appearance and pay back 7.5% of earnings achieved through that appearance. Camby who was
then in the NBA, cut the university a check for $151,617 in a tax deductible donation. In the end,
the only loser is the federal government, who received about $60,000 less than they would have
been owed from Marcus Camby in income taxes. 219 What is actually gained through these
enforcement mechanisms? These few cases are simply brief examples of the absurdity that is the
NCAA. One could write volumes on the thousands and thousands of similar ludicrous
investigations and punishments of the Association.
The large rulebook used by the NCAA creates several moral issues that must be
addressed. First, the sheer volume of the rules manual makes it impossible for coaches or athletes
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to fully know and comprehend the rules that govern most aspects of their lives. The consequence
of not knowing a rule is the same as the penalty for willingly breaking rules; there are no
mitigating factors. The rationale behind the creation and implementation of new rules is hidden
in a shroud of secrecy, lacking any true accountability or transparency. Athletes have no voice in
this system, and this simple fact contributes greatly to the level of exploitation.
Second, the NCAA rulebook inhibits the use of practical moral deliberation about ethical
problems, and has the effect of allowing those tasked with enforcement to mitigate their ethical
failings by appealing to the rulebook. Athletes who are accused of breaking rules are labeled as
cheaters, whether they have actually broken a rule or not. The NCAA is well aware that they
cannot effective police all colleges and universities, but they manage to level penalties frequently
as violations tend to occur at every institution in the system. Enforcement of rules is not
evenhanded, and the sanctions handed down by the Association often miss their intended targets,
as players and coaches can flee to professional ranks without accepting punishment. Those
athletes that have not broken any rules are often left to suffer the consequences.
These unfortunate truths about the system are yet another example of the exploitation
suffered by college athletes. The following two chapters will examine the policies of the NCAA
in more depth, further stressing the need for reform in college athletics.
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Chapter 10: The Amateur Propaganda
NCAA Bylaw 12.01.1 decrees only amateurs may compete in intercollegiate athletics. 220
Article 12 of the Division I manual lays out all rules concerning the amateur status of athletes. In
Bylaw 12.01.4, the Association claims a grant-in-aid scholarship does not constitute pay for
athletic performance so long as it does not exceed what is permitted by the NCAA. 221 The
Association and its member schools cannot possibly believe this. In all likelihood, they do not.
But they do not have to, so long as the public believes it, their system is safe.
Sack and Staurowsky argue that institutions of higher learning paying expenses for
talented athletes so they can provide entertainment is not inherently wrong, but we can however
morally question the utilization of the term amateur to set an arbitrary limit on what constitutes
permissible payment. 222 They contend that denying these athletes fair compensation, when they
are clearly being recruited as athletes first is “anachronistic and highly exploitive.” 223
No other university student is so highly restricted and regulated than the college athlete.
Students in any other area can use the skills they are developing in college to earn a living
outside the school without jeopardizing their scholarship. Theatre students, band students, and
even academically gifted students can all use their talents in any way they see fit to earn money,
with the exception of the college athlete.
The concept of an amateur is a relatively recent invention. Supporters of the amateur
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model argue that the ancient Greek and Roman sportsmen were the first original amateurs.
However, as Peter French points out this certainly was not the case, as these athletes often
competed for precious metals and varying other valuable goods. 224 French explains how the
word evolved from being used to describe something undertaken as a hobby to something used
to “perpetuate what we now regard as a morally indefensible social system” in nineteenth
century Britain. 225 The British used the term amateur to exclude certain groups from athletic
competition, namely the working class, deeming those who worked for a living as
professionals. 226
Amateurism was simply a device to exclude those who were in a lower class, presumably
because these individuals were better suited to compete in athletic contests, but the main purpose
was to delineate social status. 227 Amateurs were supposed to perfect their sporting craft in their
spare time, avoiding any type of methodical training. 228 The NCAA’s ideal of an amateur athlete
is one who seeks the internal goods of sport, for the love of the game, as opposed to seeking
financial remuneration. The Olympics clung to this antiquated notion until 1987. 229
The NCAA soon realized that the best athletes could not, or would not play college sports
without some type of compensation. In the early years of the Association, living expenses and
tuition were commonly paid by members of the community or local boosters. In order to
standardized compensation across all institutions, the NCAA allowed full athletic grant-in-aid
scholarships. This step effectively ended the associations experiment with amateur athletics.
Athletes are now being paid a wage to compete in intercollegiate athletics, yet the NCAA
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permits this so long as they can dictate how much the athlete gets, a rather random amount.
If the NCAA is truly concerned with the welfare of college athletes, why would they ever
revoke a player’s eligibility? 230 To illustrate how little the Association cares about athlete
welfare, consider the case of Vincent Edward Jackson, better known simply as Bo. Arguably the
greatest athlete of all-time, Bo Jackson was in fact the best two-sport athlete we have ever seen.
He dominated on both the baseball field, crushing 500 foot homeruns with ease, and on the
football field, overpowering and out running defenses. 231
Bo could not finish his senior baseball season at Auburn University because he flew on a
private jet owned by Hugh Culverhouse to visit and workout with the Tampa Bay Buccaneers,
also owned by Culverhouse. Buccaneer team executives had told Bo they cleared the trip with
NCAA compliance officers, as he was worried about losing his eligibility for baseball, a sport he
loved to play. 232 In his words; “My senior year, I am tearing the cover off the ball.” 233 Four or
five days after his trip, Bo was preparing for an upcoming baseball game. He was approached on
the field by his coach who asked if he had indeed flew on Culverhouse’s jet, to which Bo
responded yes, but it had been cleared through the NCAA.
Bo’s coach responded by telling him that the trip was not cleared, and he had been ruled
permanently ineligible for all sports by the NCAA. Bo Jackson describes the situation; “I sat
there on that ground and I cried like a baby.” 234 Hal Baird, Bo’s baseball coach at Auburn, said
“it crushed Bo, and it crushed all of us because it was as innocent a thing as could be and it cost
him the second half of his senior year in baseball, and at that time, we all thought it had cost him
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first round status in the baseball draft.” 235
Bo Jackson was a Heisman Trophy winning running back, one of the best athletes to step
foot on a college campus, and the NCAA took away his eligibility for plane ride. A case like this
highlights how trivial NCAA rules can be. The Association claims most rules are to ensure
competitive equity and amateurism, and yet this punishment does neither. Bo Jackson did not
gain any competitive advantage from being on that plane, and it is only an impermissible benefit
because the Association deemed it as such. If the welfare of student athletes is what is most
important, why are cases like this the norm?
The fact is colleges do not run their athletic departments as amateur endeavors. Peter
French describes the situation:
Amateurism, defined in monetary terms, is the relatively easy way the NCAA has
attempted to promote the ideal of competitive equity, and it does so, not surprisingly,
along lines roughly similar to those used by upper-class sportsmen, the gentlemen
amateurs to exclude what they regarded as those who would skew the level of
competition because they were better fit to succeed at the sport. All the rest is mere
rhetoric without substance in intercollegiate athletics. 236
Amateurism is a device used to restrict what the cartel’s unrecognized labor force can earn for
their participation in sport. If athletes were given a commensurate wage for what they are
required to do, what exactly would change about college sports? The games would go on,
universities would continue to make millions of dollars off the hard work of their athletes, and
everyone could stop pretending, removing the hypocrisy inherent in the current system.
The general public has bought the NCAA rhetoric. When rules are broken, and college
amateurs cross that imaginary line into professional sports, they are vilified by the media and
rabid fan bases. Cries of corruption erupt from the masses; young adults are treated like
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criminals, criminals who sully the good name of amateur college sports, college sports which
should be played solely for the intrinsic goods of the game. The millions universities pull in are
not mentioned. It is time we reject the semantics and rhetoric of the NCAA, and shift our focus
to the real problem, the exploitation and manipulation of college athletes.
Amateurism, defined in financial terms by the NCAA is the most sacred principle held in
college sports. This is morally problematic because there is no clear rationale given for
adherence to this principle. Amateurism, as the NCAA understands it does not have historic
significance as evidenced by the fact that ancient Greek and Roman competitors competed for
valuable prizes. The Association cannot show why this principle is necessary, and by clinging to
it they are harming those whom they claim they are protecting, student athletes. The story of Bo
Jackson is a prime example of this, and is not merely an isolated incident. Thousands of student
athletes suffer undue harms in this system, and the reasoning offered does not justify the harm
being done. The intercollegiate principle of amateurism is morally problematic, and must be
eliminated from the NCAA vernacular. This point will be further elucidated in chapter fifteen.
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Chapter 11: Recruiting and Transfer Rules: Stabilizing the Workforce
Like all pieces of Association legislation, rules restricting the movement of athletes have
an ulterior motive. Simply put, recruiting rules are intended to curtail wild spending sprees by
universities in pursuit of highly sought after athletes. 237 By putting restrictions on recruiting, it
standardizes how schools can go about trying to bring in elite athletes. This keeps recruiting
costs to a minimum, not allowing coaches to transfer rents from institutions and themselves to
recruits and their families. 238 In theory, if all schools play by the rules (for the most part), they all
accumulate revenues.
When recruiting rules are not followed, chaos ensues. A look at the infamous Southwest
conference between the 1960’s and the 1980’s is a classic example 239. During this time period,
illicit payments to athletes were common place among all member institutions, and the end result
was athletes shaking down universities for as much money as they could get. Athletes were given
large amounts of money and even cars in exchange for their commitment. The end result was all
conference members being forced to break rules to keep up in recruiting. Arthur Fleischer, Brian
Goff and Robert Tollison point out that the NCAA, like most cartels, faces a problem of schools
cheating in order to gain an advantage, which increases their share of cartel rents. 240
If one school cheats against the agreement, they can see substantial benefits, so long as
they avoid detection by the NCAA. When all schools cheat, it gives the power to the athletes.
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Athletes in this scenario can demand anything they wish from schools, which will pay so they
do not lose prized recruits to heated rivals. Recruiting rules are covered in article 13 of the
Association manual and covers all conceivable interactions between anyone associated with an
institution and the prospective athlete.
Perhaps the most glaring indication the NCAA is a cartel determined to maximize profits
for its member institutions is the transfer restrictions that apply to athletes. If a player transfers
from one Division I institution to another, they are required to sit out of competition for one full
academic year, per Bylaw 14.5.1:
Bylaw 14.5.1 - A student who transfers (see Bylaw 14.5.2) to a member institution from
any collegiate institution is required to complete one full academic year of residence (see
Bylaw 14.02.13) at the certifying institution before being eligible to compete for or to
receive travel expenses from the member institution (see Bylaw 16.8.1.2), unless the
student satisfies the applicable transfer requirements or qualifies for an exception as set
forth in this bylaw. (Revised: 1/10/91 effective 8/1/91, 4/27/00 effective 8/1/01, 5/19/08,
6/24/09, 4/14/10) 241
Bylaw 14.5.5.1 explains this residency rule, “[a] transfer student from a four-year institution
shall not be eligible for intercollegiate competition at a member institution until the student has
fulfilled a residence requirement of one full academic year (two full semesters or three full
quarters) at the certifying institution.”242
The rational for this rule is that athletes are supposedly students first and must become
acclimated to a new academic atmosphere before competing in intercollegiate competition, yet in
reality it is clearly a way to inhibit the movement of athletes amongst universities. 243 George
Sage describes transfer rules as market stabilizers, which function as a way to save money for the
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cartel by not allowing schools to bid on athletes from other institutions.244 Without transfer
restrictions, an athlete who slipped through the recruiting nets of big-time programs could go to a
smaller institution, compile impressive statistics for one season, and jump to a larger school the
following year.
By requiring an athlete to sit out a full season, the incentive to leave is greatly
diminished. Athletes have a finite amount of eligibility, and for a player eying professional ball a
year on the bench can negatively impact their draft stock. Unfortunately for the Association, their
actions have undercut their unconvincing rationale for this rule. As discussed earlier, in the wake
of scandal at an institution, athletes who will run out of eligibility before the postseason
sanctions are lifted are free to transfer to any institution that will have them without being
required to sit out a year.
If an athlete needs a residence year to become a true member of their student body like
the Association claims, why are athletes from scandal ridden schools allowed to transfer and play
immediately at new institutions? The scandal at Penn State which led to a four year postseason
ban for the football program, among many other sanctions, for example, was levied in July of
2012, just two months before the start of the 2012 season. All current Penn State football players
were allowed to transfer to any school and were immediately eligible to play. Other universities
use opportunities like this to raid a program. 245
If these athletes do not need time to adjust and integrate into their student bodies, why
would any athlete? According to bylaw 14.5.5.2.10, the residency rule only applies to baseball,
basketball, men’s ice hockey, and FBS football. These four sports also happen to be the only
consistent producers of large revenues for colleges. Athletes in these sports can also transfer to
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Division II or III schools without being forced to sit out a year. The number of athletes willing to
lose the publicity Division I athletics brings is small, so there is no reason to restrict downward
movement. The Division II transfer is commonly used by athletes who get in trouble and need to
stay on the field one more season before turning pro. 246
This serves as clear evidence that the NCAA only seeks to restrict the movement of
athletes in revenue producing sports. Transfer rules serve wholly as a means to limit the mobility
of the unrecognized employees of universities. Coaches and athletic directors can move freely at
any time they wish, with the biggest restriction being an exit fee required to buy out their current
contract, something their new institution usually picks up. If an athlete is recruited and commits
to a university to play for a specific coach, that athlete cannot follow his coach to the new
institution without being forced to sit out one year, and this can only happen if the current
institution releases the athlete and does not block their new institution request. As we have seen,
the only function served by transfer rules is to keep athlete movement under control.
The 2013 college basketball season shows an example of how coaches can abandon the
athletes they allegedly care so much about. Florida Gulf Coast University head men’s basketball
coach Andy Enfield brought his small program into the national spotlight by advancing the
fifteenth seed Eagles into the Sweet Sixteen in the NCAA Championship tournament. The Eagles
were featured on sports and news programs all week long leading up to their matchup with the
Florida Gators, with Enfield often discussing how proud he was of his players. After their victory
over the two seeded Georgetown University Hoyas, the players gathered around their beloved
coach and chanted “Andy.”
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The Eagles ran out of magic on March 29th, being knocked out of the tournament after a
loss to the Gators. The media and the country had fallen in love with the small program from
Fort Myers, Florida, and many hoped to see the program improve on its success the following
season. However, just three days later Enfield accepted the head coaching position at the
University of Southern California, signing a six-year contract. This is the problem with college
sports. Coaches are free to move at any time and the players they recruit are simply afterthoughts
in their pursuit to fame and fortune.
Transfer rules, much like recruiting rules have a rationale given by the Association that
they are necessary for equity in athletics. However, further investigation shows that these rules,
much like all other NCAA rules, conveniently benefit the Association and its member
institutions while causing undue harm to the athletes. These severe restrictions on athlete
autonomy further the case that college athletes are being unfairly exploited. All actors in the
present system can move without penalty with the exception of those athletes in revenue
producing sports. The NCAA, through legislation adopted by its member institutions finds itself
occupying a morally indefensible position. The following chapter will address how former
student athletes are attempting to institute a change in the status quo through a landmark court
case that could permanently alter the current landscape of intercollegiate athletics.
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Chapter 12: Change on the Horizon?
The NCAA is currently involved in a legal battle that could potentially alter the current
college landscape in an unprecedented way. The case has been described as the NCAA’s worst
nightmare, and it seeks to change how athletes are compensated for the use of their images. 247
What is at issue in this case is whether or not the law requires athletes to be compensated for the
unauthorized use of their image in video games and television broadcasts facilitated by the
NCAA.
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The original suit was filed in 2009 by Sam Keller, a former college quarterback for
Arizona State University from 2003 to 2005, and the University of Nebraska in 2007. 249 Keller
filed suit against Electronic Arts, Inc. (hereafter EA), a popular video game manufacturer, as
well as the NCAA and the Collegiate Licensing Company (hereafter CLC) for, among other
things, violating his right of publicity, contending that the NCAA violated his amateur status by
licensing EA to use his image in their video game. 250 The right of publicity complaint covers all
representation that can reasonably be understood to represent a specific individual; hence it does
not actually have to be a portrait of the complaining party. 251 The case has since been
consolidated with separate cases, including two filed by former University of California, Los
Angeles (UCLA) basketball player Ed O’Bannon and former University of Cincinnati basketball
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player Oscar Robertson, among others. 252
These former players are arguing the NCAA unlawfully profited from the use of their
images and are seeking compensation from the sale of video games and a slice of broadcast
revenues as well. 253 Stanford University economist Roger Noll has created a formula to show
how much money the players would be entitled to share if the NCAA did not put restrictions on
athlete earnings, breaking the numbers down by conferences and individual schools. 254 For
example, under this formula SEC football players during the 2009-2010 season would be entitled
to share $61.5 million. 255 If the NCAA indeed loses this court case, athletes will be compensated
for their work by earning a percentage of the revenues they generate.
The video games in question refer to NCAA Football and NCAA Basketball, which are
created annually by EA. The problem with these games is they portray current student athletes in
vivid detail. For example, NCAA football 13 has most college football players (real rosters
usually have 90-120 player’s whereas the games rosters are capped at 70) from the 2012 season,
including some incoming freshman yet to play a collegiate game. The players on the game
correspond to real-life players exactly, featuring their accessories and even their hometowns. The
only difference is there are no names listed. Players are identified on the game by their position
and number, so Matt Elam, strong safety for the Florida Gators is represented as SS #22.
College teams are listed by name, and the stadiums, along with the atmosphere
surrounding them is recreated in extraordinary detail. EA pays the NCAA for exclusive rights to
trademarked college football content, and each game the company produces must be approved by
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the Association and its member institutions. 256 The brilliant irony of the Keller lawsuit is he
actually is accusing the NCAA of jeopardizing his amateur status. 257
The NCAA has several bylaws that speak to this issue in some degree, but none that
directly address it. For instance, bylaw 12.5.1.9.1.1 allows corporate sponsors to use team names
and images, but not images of individual athletes. Bylaw 12.5.2.1 forbids athletes from profiting
off the use of their likeness for any reason, and bylaw 12.5.2.2. requires athletes to take steps to
stop anyone from using their image to promote products or events. 258 In order for EA to refute
the right of publicity complaint, they must show that they are a member of the news media,
which they are not, that their purpose was not commercial, which it is, or that it sufficiently
transformed player’s likenesses, which they also have not. 259 Further weakening EA’s case is the
fact that they, through their own volition, decided to remunerate quite handsomely the
professional athletes depicted in its games. 260 The Association has released a statement by Chief
Legal Officer and Executive Vice President Donald Remy on the pending case through their
website:
The NCAA is not exploiting current or former student-athletes but instead provides
enormous benefit to them and to the public. This case has always been wrong -- wrong
on the facts and wrong on the law. We look forward to its eventual resolution in the
courts. Amateurism in intercollegiate sports has been repeatedly upheld by courts at all
levels from the Supreme Court in 1984 to a District Court just last month.261
This response is not surprising. The NCAA and its cohorts are again using their successful public
relations skills to vilify these players as agents attempting to destroy amateurism in sports. What
they fail to explain however and too many fail to ask is what is so unreasonable about wanting to
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be fairly compensated for work that cannot be made without your labor. Without the athletes,
colleges would not make a dime off athletics, yet they treat the athletes as entirely insignificant.
In 2012, emails surfaced showing EA and the CLC knowingly used the characteristics of
individual college players in the creation of their video games, which contradicts prior claims by
the NCAA that these images are not based on real athletes. 262 The fact that the game images are
based off real players is apparent to even a casual observer of college football. The reason EA
sports does so well in selling the game is the vivid detail and life-like nature involved. As the
case unfolded, University of Nebraska Chancellor Harvey Perlman wrote in an email, “I’m still
trying to figure out by what authority the NCAA licenses these rights to the game makers and
others. I looked at what our student athletes sign by way of waiver and it doesn’t come close.” 263
CLC executive emails show a correspondence discussing how current player names are
used in the development of games to calculate the proper stats for each player before stripping
the names prior to the release of the game. 264 To muddy the waters even further, Big Ten
President Jim Delaney has released a statement declaring that any rulings allowing athletes to be
paid television revenues may result in deemphasizing sport within the Big Ten conference. 265
Delaney is threatening to take the Big Ten back to need-based only financial aid for athletes.
Delaney is absolutely against pay-for-play models of college sports, yet he somehow missed the
memo of how college athletes are currently being paid. As John Gerdy points out, it is clear to all
relevant actors (coaches, fans, media, university faculty, and the athletes) that athletes are
brought on campus to play ball, making the scholarship a form of payment for their athletic
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services. 266
Some say they applaud Delaney’s comments, and feel the deemphasizing of big-time
sport is an action that should be lauded, putting education ahead of college sports dollars. 267
Delaney is receiving too much credit. Those who applaud his statement clearly did not listen to
what he said. Right now, he is completely fine with college sports. He sees no problem in
exploiting the athletic talents of young men for financial gain. The only problem he has is when
these athletes demand what they are rightfully entitled to. This, to Delaney, is completely out of
the question. He would rather cut off all money for his conference than settle for a more
reasonable piece of the pie. This should not be applauded by anyone.
In 1994, the Big Ten distributed $43.5 million to its eleven conference members; in 2012,
the conference distributed $284 million to twelve schools, a 600% revenue increase. 268 There is
plenty of money to go around, plenty of money to end the hypocrisy and dead rhetoric of the
Association, yet, to people like Jim Delaney, there’s only enough for the plantation owners. The
case will get even more interesting as it plays out. Walter Byers, former NCAA President has
agreed to be deposed. 269 Byers can be credited with turning the Association into what it is today,
and he may play a large role in taking it down. Sports columnist Clay Travis sums up the
situation rather appropriately:
If the NCAA ends up settling this case -- which it would likely do if the case is certified
as a class action -- then those payments would violate NCAA rules, rendering every
current player ineligible under NCAA rules. Yep, the NCAA would become the greatest
infringer of NCAA rules in the history of amateur athletics. What a fitting ending to the
organization. 270
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The O’Bannon Court case may have a profound impact on the intercollegiate athletic
system. The NCAA has a mixed history with the court system, losing key battles in the past, as
seen in the Nemeth case, the Van Horn case, and the anti-trust case of 1984 discussed in previous
chapters. The comments offered by Big Ten President Jim Delaney show how entrenched the
NCAA and its cohorts have become in their own rhetoric. They can no longer view the system
objectively, and their partisanship has blinded them to the blatant exploitation inherent in the
system. The NCAA could see reform of the system forced on them by the courts because they
have violated their own rules on amateurism by selling the images and likenesses of student
athletes without permission for the purpose of making a profit. The financial picture of
intercollegiate sports is bright, as seen in Table 2 from chapter seven. Chapter 13 will explore
these financial issues further.
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Chapter 13: The Financial Picture
The NCAA and its member institutions function as non-profit entities, which affords
them numerous financial protections and tax breaks. In August 1997, H.R. 2014 was signed into
law, which allows nonprofit entities the right not to pay taxes on advertisement payments they
receive. 271 The law allows for companies such as Nike to pay advertising dollars to universities
in exchange for corporate logos, so long as there are no comparisons to other companies, and
colleges do not have to pay the corporate tax rate associated with advertising payments. 272
Booster donations are tax exempt as well, even though most colleges use donations as a
prerequisite for purchasing season tickets; making these not donations but prices for desired
goods. 273
Colleges also bring in millions of untaxed dollars annually through their sports programs,
mainly in Division I college football and basketball. As mentioned in chapter seven, athletic
department financial figures are required to be reported annually under The Equity in Athletics
Act, applying to all colleges and universities receiving Title IX funding. 274 The accounting
practices utilized by schools vary wildly from institution to institution, so the true numbers are
often difficult to ascertain. 275 For example, an expense to one institution may not even be listed
on the books by another institution. For smaller institutions, revenues from football will match
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precisely the expense for that sport. In 2011, Arkansas State University reported a $4,341,626
football revenue figure, which corresponded identically with a $4,341,626 football expense
number. 276
This is either a fiscal miracle that magically repeats itself at dozens of institutions yearly,
or colleges are afraid to admit they run a losing program. For schools like Texas, Michigan, and
Alabama the numbers are more indicative of how the program fares. The particular numbers are
not so important however, as the system is not designed for universities to report huge surpluses
each year. 277 Because colleges are nonprofit institutions, there is no one waiting to claim the
money left over, thus surpluses must and indeed do find their way into expense categories. 278 If
huge surplus revenues are known to exist, boosters may stop giving, athletes will want their fair
share, and the perks afforded to NCAA and university employees may well dry up. 279
Because there are no shareholders to claim excess revenues, all available money must be
spent. The presence of an elite athlete on a university campus can generate millions of dollars for
an institution, as is currently the case with Johnny Manziel (Texas A&M), and has been with Bo
Jackson (Auburn), Tim Tebow (Florida), Patrick Ewing (Georgetown), and Doug Flutie (Boston
College). According to The Equity in Athletics Data Analysis, the NCAA Division I grand total
of revenue for all teams under its jurisdiction in 2011 was $6,698,111,630. 280 Football accounted
for $2,956,499,371 of this total, while basketball was just over $893 million, and women’s
basketball which has been growing in popularity in recent years accumulated over $172
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million.281 Very few in the general public realize college sports is a six-and-a-half billion dollar a
year industry, which perhaps leads to the public’s anger at athletes who speak out against a
system the NCAA has convinced them is fair and balanced; one they should be lucky to be a part
of.
The NCAA also receives television revenue rights from the annual men’s March
Madness basketball tournament, of which about sixty percent is returned to Division I level
conferences and universities. 282 The 2011-2012 fiscal year reported that figure was $503 million
dollars, roughly sixty-two percent. 283 For the 2008-2009 fiscal year, the number was
$388,901,094, which is a 29.338% increase in just three years.
Another common expense of big-time athletic programs is known as a guarantee game.
This is where larger, well established programs pay smaller universities to travel to their stadium
with the expectation of probably losing the game. 284 Bigger FBS programs will pay FCS schools
to come to their stadium for what usually turns out to be an easy victory. 285 The money changing
hands for these games can range anywhere form a few hundred thousand dollars up to a millionand-a-half dollars. Ohio State paid the Naval Academy $1.45 million dollars in 2009 to travel to
Columbus and get beaten thoroughly. 286
These games have become commonplace, with 101 out of 124 FBS teams (81.4percent;
86.7 percent from the big six conferences) playing at least one game against an FCS opponent

281

“The Equity in Athletics Data Analysis Cutting Tool,” U.S. Department of Education,
http://ope.ed.gov/athletics/index.aspx.
282
“Distributions,” National Collegiate Athletic Association, http://www.ncaa.org/.
283
Ibid.
284
Jack Carey, “For Small Schools, There's a Big Payoff to Road Trips," USA TODAY, September 3,
2009, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/college/football/2009-09-02-smallschool_payoffs_N.htm.
285
They also pay other FBS opponents who are, for the most part, athletically inferior, but these games
typically cost more (Carey 2009).
286
Paul Steinbach, "Non-Conference Scheduling Leads to Lopsided Scores, Balanced Books," Athletic
Business, November 2010, http://www.athleticbusiness.com/articles/article.aspx?articleid=3656&zoneid=8.

90
last season. 287 This is not only confined to football, basketball teams engage in these
arrangements as well. In 2010, Mississippi Valley State University racked up $700 thousand to
play a grueling thirteen consecutive games on the road against, among others, the University of
Kentucky, Marquette University, and Butler University; all of whom rank annually in the top 25
polls. 288
Clearly, college sports is big business. Since we know the money is not going to the
players who generate it, a reasonable question would be who is in fact benefiting from this
arrangement. One aspect that has been overlooked thus far is the coaches’ salaries. College
coaches are paid quite handsomely, and it is actually against NCAA rules for a coach to work for
free (the irony is palpable). 289
John Calipari, head basketball coach at the University of Kentucky has quite a lucrative
contract. 290 To begin, Kentucky paid coach Calipari’s exit fee from the University of Memphis,
$200 thousand, and paid him a base salary of $400 thousand a year. He gets anywhere from
$2.85-$3.4 million a year from broadcasting and endorsement payments. In bonuses, he can
receive $50 thousand each for winning the regular season SEC title and the SEC conference
tournament, $100 thousand for a Sweet 16 appearance in the NCAA end of year tournament,
$175 thousand for advancing to the Final Four, $375 thousand for winning the tournament, $100
thousand more if his players meet academic progress and graduation numbers, $750 thousand for
staying at the university in 2014, and $1 million if he is still at the university in 2015.
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On top of this he is given two new cars for business and pleasure, along with
reimbursement for all business related mileage, an expense account, and relocation
reimbursements. He is given twenty prime, lower level tickets for each basketball home game
and for each postseason tournament game, as well as eight complimentary football home game
tickets. Also included, one month’s paid vacation and membership in a local golf and country
club of his choice, with the university picking up the initiation fees and monthly dues.
After leading Memphis to the 2008 National Championship game, the university
extended his contract through 2012-2013 with a base salary of $2.35 million, and a $5 million
bonus if he stayed through the duration of his contract. Shortly after the loss, Calipari agreed to
become the head coach at Kentucky. I suppose the bluegrass is greener. Peter French assesses the
situation: “The issue that we could raise with respect to the compensation of coaches in the elite
sports is that even though there may be no moral prohibition against their receiving multimilliondollar compensation packages, a moral line is overstepped if one of the bases of those
compensation packages is the exploitation of other human beings.” 291 The current system of
intercollegiate athletics has become so commonplace it is not questioned by those who can effect
change. The arrangement is accepted because that is simply the way it works. We must question
why more college coaches do not see a problem earning millions of dollars off the blood and
sweat of broke, young adults.
The tax exempt status of the NCAA and its member intuitions serves as a primary reason
to refuse that intercollegiate sports are in fact a business venture designed to generate revenue. If
this is admitted, the Association and its members would be required to pay taxes associated with
this fiscal endeavor. There is an extortionate amount of money involved in intercollegiate sports,
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and because these institutions are labeled as non-profit, there are no shareholders to collect
dividends. The money made is used to finance large perk and compensation packages for the
overseers of college sports, while those who make the generation of this money possible receive
nothing commensurate for the work they do. This arrangement is unfair according to a Rawlsian
understanding of fairness, which requires that each actor should benefit after having completed
their fair workload in a just arrangement. The system is not just, and the overseers do not
contribute enough to the system to justify their paychecks. The following chapter will invoke a
deontological ethic to further validate these claims.
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Chapter 14: An Ethical Audit of the System
Based on the evidence provided, college sports function as a business enterprise intent on
generating revenue. The purpose for generating this revenue is multifaceted; it can serve as a tool
to evaluate athletic programs, it can contribute to the growth and overall success of a program,
and it can be used to offer perks to those who oversee the program, among many other things. So
is any of this inherently wrong? On face value, the answer is no. Each of these goals is not in and
of itself morally problematic.
The problem is uncovered when we look closely at how the money for these goals is
being generated. College athletes are being exploited by universities and the NCAA in an effort
to generate enormous sums of money. In order to ethically evaluate this system however, we
must look at it in more depth; at the intricacies and nuances involved to see where ethical
shortcomings lie, and determine what, if any changes can and should be made to the present state
of affairs. To accomplish this, utilization of a deontological ethic will prove useful and
insightful.
A deontological ethical system will focus on moral principles as duties. Our discussion
thus far has highlighted several principles we can examine within the framework of
intercollegiate athletics, such as fairness, autonomy, and voluntary informed consent. To begin
we must define what is meant by these terms. Fairness, as discussed earlier in chapter seven is
understood as fulfilling ones agreed upon role in a just system. James Shulman and William
Bowen add that fairness entails “treating equally individuals in the same circumstances and
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avoiding undeserved favoritism.” 292 Fairness does not demand all individuals be treated alike; it
simply calls for equitable treatment in similar cases.
Autonomy asks for individuals to be in charge of their lives, or the ability to choose
freely one’s own path in life. In a similar vein, voluntary informed consent requires that
individuals have the opportunity to make decisions about their lives in possession of all relevant
facts about a given situation. Voluntary informed consent then is inextricably linked to autonomy
in the sense that it is impossible to choose one’s own path if they are not in possession of all
relevant facts. Let us begin with fairness.
The issue of fairness has come up many times in the discussion of the NCAA, most
notably in discussions of compensation. It is not unreasonable for individuals to expect a fair
wage in return for services rendered. The most generous estimation of a Division I football
scholarship’s value over a four-year period is around $230,000. All of this money however is
tied up in costs associated with room, board, tuition, and fees. The university however, can
expect to bring in on the low end $80 million to $100 million during this span, and on the high
end $200 million to $400 million. The athlete in this scenario is receiving well under one percent
of the revenue they are responsible for producing.
The amount of money big-time college football programs bring in is staggering, while the
costs to fund athletes living expenses are minimal in comparison. The system is designed to
function in this manner. Immanuel Kant, the most renowned deontological ethical theorist, in his
third formulation of the categorical imperative writes, “for rational beings all stand under the law
that every one of them ought to treat itself and others never merely as means, but always at the
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same time as [an] end in itself.” 293 This means that rational human beings are not prohibited
from using one another to achieve their goals in life; however, they must not use another merely
as a means to achieve their own ends. Treating an individual as a mere means fails to respect that
individual’s rational nature, or their autonomy. Kant is speaking of a basic respect for persons.
For our purposes, athletic departments are using football and basketball players merely as
a means to generate revenue. As we have seen, their individual well-being is of no concern to the
powers that be. The never-ending supply of athletes ensures that the well of talented athletes will
never dry out, couple this with the lack of viable alternatives for athletes, and we clearly see the
athletes are being used solely for sake of generating revenues.
Fairness however can apply to the system in other ways. Concerning the enforcement of
NCAA rules, punishments are hardly consistent and evenhanded. Punishments for infractions
vary widely depending on the school, conference affiliation, and the player. Like cases are
almost never treated similarly. The NCAA arbitrarily hands down whatever punishment it is in
the mood for on that current day. Recall the case of A.J. Green, suspended four games for selling
his jersey. Former Ohio State running back Daniel “Boom” Herron was suspended five games in
2010 for selling his jersey, pants, and shoes, also for $1,000.
Why was Herron’s suspension one game more than Green’s for the same amount of
money? Also, Herron was suspended at the end of the year, before Ohio State’s bowl game, yet
he was allowed to participate in that contest, as were fellow suspended teammates Terrell Pryor,
and DeVeir Posey, among others. Could it be Ohio State was slated to play in the All State Sugar
Bowl that season? The absence of these players could have severely altered the outcome of the
game, which saw Ohio State defeat Arkansas 31-26. The lack of transparency within the
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Association prohibits us from understanding the logic, if there is indeed any, behind the
arbitrariness of their rulings.
Continuing with fairness, why is the University of Georgia allowed to sell A.J. Green’s
jersey, yet he is not? While Green attended Georgia, his jersey was for sale in many different
varieties with price tags ranging from $59.99 to $150. 294 Fairness would dictate Green receive
some, if not most of that money, or be allowed to sell his jersey on his own, or that Georgia not
be allowed to sell his jersey either. It is difficult to see any logic in the NCAA’s policy against
athletes selling their property. Would Green or Herron have been suspended for selling their
televisions? Because someone happens to play college sports, they cannot sell their own
property. Perhaps, if athletes were paid a living wage to engage in sports, they would not have to
sell their possession to live a normal life. The system is clearly not fair to the athletes.
Switching to autonomy, we see here too the system fails to meet the moral requirements
of a deontic ethic. Playing Division I football or basketball is a voluntary activity. No one is
forced into athletic competition. The problem arises when we realize that, concerning football at
least, there are no true viable alternatives available to athletes who seek to play in the NFL.
There are arena football leagues and the Canadian Football League, but these are not realistic
avenues for an eighteen year old to pursue if their ultimate goal is to play in the NFL. There are a
limited number of teams in these leagues, and they do not garner the same high level media
exposure even the worst college teams enjoy.
Major League Baseball (MLB) has an expansive minor league system designed to
develop the skills of athletes attempting to pursue a professional career in baseball. High school
baseball players with the requisite skills thus have a choice; attend a university and handle the
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demands of being both a student and an athlete, or sign with a professional team and focus solely
on becoming an excellent athlete. The result is higher graduation rates for college baseball
players because they have made the choice to pursue education, it was not forced on them as a
caveat to pursing dreams of reaching the professional ranks like it is on football and basketball
players. Because baseball players are given a choice, their graduation rates are on average higher
than football and basketball. Those who become student athletes do so as a result of an
autonomous choice.
For football players, this choice does not exist. Because of this, many enroll in college
not actually wanting to be there, and attempt to scrape by in the classroom and avoid trouble off
the field long enough to meet the requirements for the NFL Draft. They are forced to attend
because there are no other realistic avenues for them to pursue. Player autonomy is also severely
inhibited by the NCAA rules. We have seen this already by restricting what players can do with
what they thought was their property, but it is also evidenced in the transfer restriction imposed
on them.
For whatever reason, an athlete may decide he no longer wants to attend a university.
Why are they then not allowed to transfer to any institution they wish? Why do transfers rules
only apply to revenue producing sports? An athlete who grows up with the desire to play with a
specific coach may get that dream realized, but if his coach leaves for a better job, the athlete is
forced to surrender a year of his eligibility to follow his dream. If his coach were to leave again
the following year, something not out of the question in this day and age, the athlete could not
follow him or he would never get a chance to see the field.
These restrictions are in place to stabilize the unacknowledged workforce of
intercollegiate athletics. There is no other logical explanation that can be given. The issue of
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voluntary informed consent is relevant here as well. Coaches and recruiters paint very rosy
pictures of their programs during the recruiting process. Sales pitches often do not include the
coach saying, “I plan on leaving for another, high paying job shortly after you commit.” They
also do not tell athletes parents, “We struggle to graduate 47 percent of our football players.”
This is what is known as a bait-and-switch. Recruits are being deceived by coaches who
highlight only positive aspects of their program, ignoring crucial information the athlete only
realizes after he arrives on campus as an enrolled student. By this time, it is too late. In order for
the athlete to transfer to a new program, they must sit out of competition one full year to satisfy
the NCAA’s residency rule requirement. College athletes are not getting the deal they agree to
when they are convinced to sign their national letter-of-intent.
Informed consent plays a role in rules violations as well. There are no classes given on
what the NCAA rules actually are. Common violations are often disclosed, but few have the
time, and fewer still the ability to comprehend such an immense, confusing document. Athletes
are thrown into the system and the onus is on them to know the rules that govern their lives.
Many who commit rules violations are unaware what they are doing is a violation. Recall the
case of Bo Jackson. Bo did know (because “Bo Knows”) that flying on a private jet could be an
NCAA violation. 295 His crime was trusting executives from the Tampa Bay Buccaneers whom
he thought had his best interests at heart. Had he known the ramifications of that flight he never
would have gone, or perhaps arranged a different means of transportation.
Concerning voluntary informed consent, all actors have a role to play. Coaches need to be
honest with prospective athletes about their plans for the future, their plans for the athlete, and
about the academic success of their program. Athletes too however, if they hope to make the best
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choice for their future must learn to research institutions they wish to go to and ask the
appropriate questions. Both parties have obligations they must fulfill. Given our discussion of
fairness, autonomy, and voluntary informed consent, we can see how all of these principles work
with one another. The NCAA and its member institutions however are currently working
contrary to them.
A close examination of the principles of autonomy, fairness, voluntary informed consent,
and respect for persons shows very clearly that college athletes are being exploited in an unjust
system. The lack of viable alternatives, especially in football, makes the system inescapable to
athletes, and they lack the power to institute change to the status quo. Those who can bring about
change do not see the need for change, or if they do see the need, they lack the requisite
motivation to effectuate sweeping reforms to a broken system. The following chapter outlines
several steps that could fix college athletics, removing the exploitation aspect and providing a
fair deal for all actors.
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Chapter 15: Proposals for Change
The current situation of intercollegiate athletics looks dire. Many upon learning the facts
of the situation, and some without knowing, call for big-time athletics to be removed from
universities all together. This is not the proper response to the problem however. The issue is not
that universities utilize their athletic departments to generate large amounts of revenue; the issue
is they refuse to admit their goals, and the athletes are exploited in the process.
The first step towards re-inventing college athletics is to do away with the NCAA rule
book. We have seen the problems associated with the rules, including their arbitrary
enforcement. The problem with rule based approaches is individuals typically blindly follow the
rules and do not exercise practical morality. The rules that govern college athletics should be
replaced by a set of general principles that require agents to think about specific cases and
exercise moral judgment. 296 A switch to general principles would require those enforcing the
rules to think about cases and to provide justification for their rulings. 297 The justifications will
need to be made public to provide much needed transparency to the system.
This switch in governing philosophy will also see an end to arbitrary rules that cannot be
justified. Athletes will be afforded the same benefits all others involved with this system have.
The transfer rule will be eliminated, as will rules regarding what athletes can earn off their image
and celebrity, and their own property as well. 298 This will mean some athletes are afforded
opportunities that others are not, but fairness does not dictate we treat all athletes the same. Some
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are more valuable than others, and there is nothing inherently wrong with this. More marketable
skills earn individuals higher wages in all walks of life, college sports are no different.
To cover the average athlete, we should also require the NCAA and its member intuitions
to offer an equal share of broadcasting rights, merchandise sales, and video game sales. The
pending O’Bannon case discussed earlier provides a template for this arrangement. Stanford
economist Roger Noll has made the argument that athletes are entitled to fifty percent of
television revenues and one-third of video game revenues. 299 Merchandise that is currently sold
by universities often includes a few of the star player’s jerseys, minus the name, but the numbers
always match the current star or stars of the team. These jersey should include the player’s name,
and they should receive at least fifty percent of the profits generated from these sales.
Because athletic departments will be operating with less money, they will need to scale
down their size and cut wasteful expenditures. A 2011 article in Sports Illustrated devised a
model for how this would work. George Dohrmann, in conjunction with Stephen Ross, a law
professor at Penn State University, a tax lawyer, two Title IX experts, an antitrust lawyer, a
former university accountant, current and former college athletes, a sports agent and others
collaborated to undertake this task. 300 Their biggest proposal is to cut athletic scholarships in
football from 85 to 63, and cap the total roster size at 90. 301 Currently many schools have
football rosters with well over 100 hundred players. Alabama for example lists 138 football
players currently on the team. 302
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This one step will save many institutions millions of dollars a year, not just in scholarship
money, but in travel and training expenses as well. The next step would be to eliminate NCAA
mandates dictating how many Division I teams a school is required to field, which will result in
the demotion of men’s sports programs that do not financially support themselves to club
status. 303 This does not mean the elimination of all men’s sports; ice hockey, lacrosse and
baseball are likely to survive in their designated regions. 304
Concerning Title IX, schools are required to meet one of three standards to be considered
in compliance. The first requires that schools have substantial proportionality, or that their sports
programs for men and women field an equal ratio of athletes. 305 The second way a school can be
considered to be in compliance with the law is to have a history or continued progress toward
inclusion. 306 Finally, a school can have processes of adjustments that are needed to support the
involvement of women’s sports in their athletic programs. 307 The last two measures are
intentionally vague, but they essentially require that schools continue to expand opportunities for
women in intercollegiate competition. 308
Schools that meet the first test before cuts to men’s programs can make similar cuts to
their women’s programs to save even more money, but schools meeting the latter two
requirements cannot touch their women’s programs, as they do not yet possess an equal ratio. 309
Schools can save money in other ways as well. By re-drawing conferences to reflect regional
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associations as opposed to who can generate the most television dollars, schools will save in
travel costs. Keeping with travel, athletic departments can also hit the road in lighter fashion, not
bringing the spirit squad, the baton team, the cheerleaders, and band members on every road trip.
Or perhaps they could work out rotating schedules to allow some to attend each away game, but
not all.
Athletic departments need to be scaled down, and if the plaintiffs prevail in the
O’Bannon case, they will be required to. USC’s Athletic Director Pat Haden has called for his
colleagues to prepare for the possibility that the NCAA will lose this case. 310 Universities can
take other steps to help with the loss of some of their revenues, and the tax costs and other
business related expenses associated with their new honest system of intercollegiate athletics.
One way this could be achieved is put forth by Murray Sperber, calling for colleges to
stop footing the bill for running professional sports team’s minor league programs. In football for
example, universities could charge NFL teams for drafting their players, say a few hundredthousand dollars for first round selections, and devise a downward sliding scale for each
subsequent round. 311 This would be a fair arrangement and one that is long overdue. The NFL
has used college football sports as a free farm system for far too long, and it is wholly unclear
why universities and particularly the NCAA have not taken steps to address this issue, given all
the money that could potentially be involved.
As for our student-athletes, universities and the NCAA can take two steps to end the
academic exploitation involved. The first would be to allow non-matriculated athletes to compete
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in intercollegiate sports. 312 This model could be applied in any number of ways, but the most
important point is athletes who have no interest in school can stop pretending, and the NCAA
member institutions can stop enrolling under qualified students. 313 Universities can have a set
number of these students who still have caps on their eligibility, and they can receive tuition
credits that can be cashed in up to ten years after their eligibility runs out. 314 Athletes can attend
any schedule of classes they think they can manage, full-time, part-time, and for the few elites,
no classes. If their professional careers do not pan out, they can return to school if they wish to
cash in the tuition credits and attempt to earn a degree.
The final step universities should take is to attempt to engage athletes in courses they see
as useful to their lives, i.e. sports. Allow athletes to major in sports. 315 In a plan developed by
David Pargman, a professor emeritus of educational psychology at Florida State University,
college athletes would still need to fulfill general education requirements, but could then take
courses designated as football and basketball majors. 316 Some of the courses Pargman lays out
are specific to these sports, but this is not a walk–in-the-park degree. Some of the more
challenging courses are anatomy and physiology, elements of business law, and elements of
contract law. 317 This is an innovative approach that could actually motivate some athletes to take
their course work seriously. These programs of study would be able to keep athlete interest; as
well as supply them a meaningful degree they could actually apply to their lives.
These changes can be implemented in intercollegiate sports without substantial costs. The
result would be the end of an exploitive system and a fair arrangement all rational actors could
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accept. The money currently involved in college sports is plentiful, and there is more than
enough to go around. By agreeing to accept a smaller share, the NCAA and its member
institutions can rectify a great wrong and put an end to an extremely harmful arrangement. The
Association was created for a good reason, and it did an excellent job in fixing the ills in college
football. The system however has gotten out of control, but it is not too late to repair it. In order
for the Association to redeem itself and restore an ethically acceptable arrangement, these
measures must be implemented.
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Conclusion
It appears difficult for a reasonable person to deny the inherent exploitation of college
athletes in the current system of intercollegiate sports. College football and basketball players
simply have no real viable alternatives to avoid this exploitation, and no voice in the present
system to effect change. They are merely replaceable cogs in the juggernaut machine that is
intercollegiate sports.
The exploitation of college athletes has gone on long enough. The NCAA and its member
institutions have succeeded in deceiving the American public for far too long with their
hypocrisy and rhetoric. Change in college athletics is needed. Given the prospects of the pending
O’Bannon court case, the NCAA would appear to have two options; reform now, or roll the dice
and risk allowing the courts to reform them later. The general public and the media are beginning
to realize the semantic tricks and double speak utilized by the Association is merely a cover for
their highly profitable commercial enterprise.
The NCAA is falling out of favor with the public, and cannot seem to go a month without
decreeing some unjustifiable ruling or exhibiting extremely unethical behavior. Their willingness
to utilize a known criminal to aid in their investigation of the University of Miami, and the total
decimation of Penn State’s football program have swayed public opinion against them. It is time
to admit the true intentions behind why athletic programs are operated the way they are.
The Association has functioned as a highly effective labor cartel for over fifty years, and
if they continue to cling to antiquated notions of amateurism when they are clearly running a
corporate enterprise, they may show themselves to be no longer useful. As an organization that
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has been a master at spinning deceitful webs through strategic public relations stunts, the NCAA
needs to accept that their reign has come to an end and embrace a new world of intercollegiate
sports. A new order that can feature a less powerful, more understanding Association, or one that
devises a new legislative body altogether. It is time to end the corruption and exploitation
currently associated with college sports. Change is needed. Change is coming.
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